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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Israel’s security challenges are manifold, complex, and 
existential.  The country has been at war with every State on its 
borders–Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon–at least once since its 
establishment in 1948.1  More distant foes, including Iran, continue 
to directly or indirectly support non-State organized armed groups 
that seek its destruction and, in some cases, the creation of a 
Palestinian State.2  Two of these, Hezbollah and Hamas, field forces 
that are especially well organized and equipped.3  
Over the years, the Israel Defense Forces (“IDF”) have launched 
thousands of strikes against their enemies.  Some have been isolated 
surgical attacks, whereas others have been integral components of 
major military campaigns.  Human rights organizations have often 
criticized the operations on the basis of the law of armed conflict 
(“LOAC”), also known as international humanitarian law or the law 
of war.4  Such criticism raises the question of whether the IDF 
                                                     
1 See generally Ian J. Bickerton & Karrla L. Clausner, A History of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict (6th ed. 2010) (describing the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict); 
Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2009). 
2 See YAAKOV KATZ & YOAZ HENDEL, ISRAEL VS. IRAN: THE SHADOW WAR 4 (1st 
ed. 2012) (overviewing Iran’s support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the 
Gaza Strip); Carol J. Williams, Iranian Officials Say They Have Armed Hamas for Fight 
With Israel, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/ 
middleeast/la-fg-israel-gaza-hamas-iran-20140804-story.html (explaining the 
material support Hamas receives from Iran). 
3 See Jeffrey D. Feltman & Daniel Benjamin, Assessing the Strength of Hizballah, 
U.S. DEP’T ST. (June 8, 2010), http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/142857.htm 
(warning of Hezbollah’s weapons and hostility as a threat to peace); Jeffrey White, 
The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014, CTC SENTINEL (Sept. 2014), 
available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-combat-performance-of-hamas-
in-the-gaza-war-of-2014 (explaining the growing threat that Hamas constitutes as 
the result of its new tactics). 
4 See, e.g., Families Under the Rubble: Israeli Attacks on Inhabited Homes, AMNESTY 
INT’L 37–42 (Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ 
MDE15/032/2014/en/ (describing Amnesty International’s views that the 
targeting of family homes by Israeli air strikes during Operation Protective Edge 
was a violation of international humanitarian law); Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza 
School Attacks, HUM. RTS. WATCH  (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/ 
11/israel-depth-look-gaza-school-attacks (detailing three separate attacks on 
school housing in the Gaza Strip which Human Rights Watch considers to violate 
international law); Jutta Bachmann et al., Gaza, 2014: Findings of an Independent 
Medical Fact-finding Mission, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS-ISRAEL 98–99 (2014), 
https://gazahealthattack.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/gazareport_eng.pdf 
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systems and processes for engaging in attacks promote compliance 
with the LOAC.  Moreover, it raises concerns regarding the legal 
standards that the IDF apply.   
This article examines both issues.  The findings set forth herein 
are derived in great part from a December 2014 research trip to Israel 
by the Authors and from a second visit by one of them in February 
2015.  The IDF granted them unprecedented access that included a 
“staff ride” of the Gaza area, inspection of an Israeli operations 
center responsible for overseeing combat operations, a visit to a 
Hamas infiltration tunnel, review of IDF doctrine and other 
targeting guidance, and briefings by IDF operators and legal 
personnel who have participated in targeting.  The Authors also 
conducted extensive interviews of senior IDF commanders and key 
IDF legal advisers.5  
Although the approach might be perceived as leading to a pro-
Israeli bias, the sole purpose of the project was to examine Israeli 
targeting systems, processes, and norms in the abstract; no attempt 
was made to assess targeting during any particular conflict or the 
legality of individual attacks.  With respect to the resulting 
                                                     
(analyzing the results of the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip from a medical 
standpoint and finding the results indicative of violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights laws); Nothing is Immune: Israel’s Destruction of 
Landmark Buildings in Gaza, AMNESTY INT’L. 21–25 (Dec. 9, 2014), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/ documents/mde15/0029/2014/en/ (finding the 
destruction of civilian buildings by the IDF to be, under the opinion of Amnesty 
International, a war crime); Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians Killed by Israeli Drone-
Launched Missiles, HUM. RTS. WATCH  (June 30, 2009),  
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0 (presenting 
evidence about six drone attacks carried out by Israel that resulted in civilian 
injuries and deaths and recommending Israel begin an independent inquiry into its 
use of aerial drones); Rain of Fire: Israel’s Unlawful Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza, 
HUM. RTS. WATCH  (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.hrw. 
org/reports/2009/03/25/rain-fire (listing six instances of the use of white 
phosphorus weapons by the IDF in populated areas of Gaza and recommending 
investigation of the IDF’s use of white phosphorus based on Human Rights Watch’s 
opinion that it was being used in a manner that violates the law of armed combat;) 
White Flag Deaths: Killings of Palestinian Civilians during Operation Cast Lead, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH  (Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/08/13/white- 
flag-deaths-0 (outlining seven examples of Israeli soldiers attacking and killing 
civilians during “Operation Cast Lead” and criticizing Israel for its failure to 
investigate these occurrences, as it is obligated to do by international law). 
5 Much of the material in this article is based directly on the interviews with 
members of the IDF and other Israeli government agencies; individual interviewees 
are not identified.  Additionally, the Authors draw on their own personal 
experience and training for much of the background material on military operations 
and law. 
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observations and conclusions, note that the Authors combine 
extensive academic and operational experience vis-à-vis targeting 
and therefore were in a unique position to assess the credibility and 
viability of Israeli assertions.6  The result was a highly granular and 
exceptionally frank dialogue.   
The article is in four parts.  Part I describes the unique 
operational environment in which Israeli forces engage in targeting 
operations.  As every conflict is different, it is essential to 
understand the operational environment before assessing the extent 
to which targeting systems and processes facilitate LOAC 
compliance.  Moreover, although LOAC norms are not conflict 
specific, the operational environment influences the legal issues that 
arise during an armed conflict.  
In Part II, the targeting process itself is surveyed.  This process 
is determined in great part by the operational environment 
described in the previous Part.  Discussion focuses on how the IDF 
organize for, and engage in, operations involving attacks on enemy 
forces.  As they differ significantly, ground and air targeting systems 
are scrutinized separately.  
Part III narrows the focus by examining those aspects of the 
Military Advocate General Corps’ (MAG) organization, 
responsibilities, and activities that are relevant to the issue of Israeli 
targeting.  As will become clear, legal advisors, including the 
Military Advocate General himself, comprise an integral facet of the 
process by which IDF operations unfold.   
Israeli positions on the LOAC are surveyed in Part IV.  Treaty 
and customary norms that govern targeting are set forth, as well as 
Israel views as to how they apply to its operations.  Some of the 
norms are the subject of international and scholarly disagreement 
regarding their precise contours and interpretation.  To the extent 
that the IDF representatives were willing to discuss them, Part IV 
sets forth the Israeli positions on these matters, together with the 
Authors’ assessment of those positions.  The article concludes with 
a general assessment of Israeli targeting.   
 
 
                                                     
6 One author is a retired U.S. Air Force targeting officer and judge advocate, 
the other an active duty Army judge advocate with extensive experience in 
targeting in current conflicts.  Both have also addressed targeting from an academic 
perspective. 
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2.   OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
 
In his masterpiece of military theory, Carl von Clausewitz 
observed that all war is inherently an interaction:  “it is not the action 
of a living force upon a lifeless mass . . . but always the collision of 
two living forces.”7  This interaction between adversaries, as well as 
the characteristics of the wider strategic environment in which a 
conflict occurs, impacts the relative values placed by each adversary 
on particular political and military objectives and, accordingly, the 
manner in which combat operations are conducted to achieve them.8  
Simply put, the operating environment at the tactical, operational, 
and strategic levels of war determines how wars will be fought. 
Like any military force, the IDF’s organization, doctrine, and 
capabilities are adapted to deal with the specific security challenges 
posed by the operational environment in which it finds itself.9  That 
environment includes the political objectives and military 
wherewithal of both Israel and its adversaries.  This Part highlights 
those aspects of the operating environment that most directly 
influence IDF targeting processes and Israeli views on the LOAC.  It 
addresses how Israel has organized to confront the threat it 
perceives, as well as how Israel’s adversaries seek to exploit the 
operational environment in an effort to neutralize Israeli strengths 
and create favorable asymmetries. 
 
2.1. Israel and the IDF 
 
                                                     
7 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 77 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret, eds., 
trans. 1984). 
8 See id. at 602 (positing that “the nature of the political aim, the scale of 
demands put forward by either side, and the total political situation of one's own 
side are all factors that in practice must decisively influence the conduct of war.”). 
9 See, e.g., DAVID E. JOHNSON, MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR HYBRID WAR: INSIGHTS 
FROM THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES IN LEBANON AND GAZA 6 (RAND Corp. 2010) 
(describing how Israel adapted its doctrine and training following the 2nd Lebanon 
War in 2006). See also Raphael D. Marcus, Military Innovation and Tactical Adaptation 
in the Israel-Hizballah Conflict: The Institutionalization of Lesson-Learning in the IDF, 38 
J. STRATEGIC STUD. 500, 506 (2014) (regarding the Israeli lessons learned process).  
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The single most important facet of warfare from Israel’s 
perspective is the proximity of the threat.  Israel is a small country—
a mere 263 miles from north to south and an average of only 45 miles 
from east to west. At its narrowest point, the distance from the West 
Bank to the sea is 9.3 miles.  Within this territory live more than eight 
million Israelis, spread between major cities like Tel Aviv, 
Jerusalem, and Haifa and hundreds of villages and towns.10   
The Gaza Strip lies on the western edge of the country, bordered 
by Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea.  Hamas, which has been in 
control of the area since 2007, launched rockets to distances of up to 
93 miles during its 2014 conflict with Israel, a range that 
encompasses all of the country’s major population centers.11  The 
rocket campaign was intense.  Between July 8 and August 6, 3,360 
rockets were launched, 2,303 of which struck Israel.12  To the north, 
Hezbollah, supported by Iran, operates freely in southern Lebanon, 
thereby also bringing much of Israel within rocket range.13 The 
rocket threat from these two areas is presently the most significant 
threat to Israel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 Israel 2008, CIA WORLD FACT BOOK (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html. 
11 Open-source reporting on Hamas rocket capabilities and ranges, including 
maps depicting range circles, are available. See, e.g., Joe Burgess & Karen Yourish, 
The Growing Reach of Hamas’s Rockets, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/13/world/middleeast/the-
growing-reach-of-hamas-rockets.html?_r=0 (depicting the past and current range 
of Hamas’s rocket weaponry); HAMAS Rockets, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Apr. 09, 
2014), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hamas-qassam.htm 
(reporting that the Khaibar-1 M302 rocket can launch a 375-pound warhead as far 
as 125 miles).  
12 Operation Protective Edge by the Numbers, THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE ISRAEL 
DEF. FORCES (Aug. 5, 2014),  http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/05/          
operation-protective-edge-numbers/ [hereinafter By The Numbers]. 
13 See generally Patrick Devenny, Hezbollah’s Strategic Threat to Israel, 13 MIDDLE 
E. Q. 31, 31–38 (2006) (demonstrating the capacity and reach of Hezbollah’s 
operational artillery). 
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Figure 1:  Rocket Threat to Israel14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the northeastern border, the contested Golan Heights, seized 
by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, provide a buffer between Israel 
and Syria; control of this strategically vital highland would allow an 
adversary to launch artillery at the Israeli lowlands and offer an 
avenue of attack into Israel’s heartland.15  While the peace between 
Israel and Egypt and Jordan, respectively, appears stable, the 
occupied West Bank that Israel seized from Jordon in 1967 is a 
source of continuing unrest.  It presents a constant low-grade 
military threat extending to the edge of Jerusalem.  Much of the West 
Bank is under the generally ineffective administrative and security 
authority of the Palestinian National Authority.  Further 
complicating Israel’s security situations are the Israeli settlements 
sprinkled throughout the West Bank, an area over which Israel 
exercises fragile military control.  
                                                     
14 Map prepared by Graphic Department, U.S. Naval War College, based on 
data from open sources. 
15 See generally ANTHONY CORDESMAN, PERILOUS PROSPECTS: THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
MILITARY BALANCE AND THE PEACE PROCESS 228–240 (1995), available at http://csis. 
org/publication/perilous-prospects-arab-israeli-military-balance-and-peace-
process (discussing the strategic importance of the Golan Heights). 
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As a consequence of its geography and the nature of the threat 
environment, the IDF is not an expeditionary force.  Unlike the 
United States, which relies on the forward presence of a standing 
force operating globally to confront threats far from its homeland, 
the IDF is configured to mobilize rapidly and frequently in order to 
deter and defeat threats on its immediate borders.  Of particular 
concern in terms of framing military strategies and tactics is the fact 
that Israel enjoys no strategic depth;16 there is literally nowhere to 
which the IDF may retreat.  When Israeli soldiers fight, they do so 
within minutes, and sometimes within view, of their homes. 
Israel’s small size and proximity to Gaza, Southern Lebanon, 
and Syria do, however, afford it the advantage of what practitioners 
of operational art refer to as an “interior position.”17  Put simply, 
while being surrounded certainly creates pressing problems for a 
military strategist, it also has the virtue of enabling one to 
concentrate forces quickly and maneuver them in any direction the 
situation may warrant.  Combat aircraft launched from anywhere in 
the country can be over Gaza or southern Lebanon in minutes, 
thereby affording the Israeli Air Force exceptional flexibility, 
reaction time, and loiter capability.  In a relative sense, the same is 
true for the ground and naval forces.  Moreover, ground and air 
assets can be quickly re-tasked to strike elsewhere as the battle 
situation unfolds and evolves.   
These factors affect the IDF’s organization, doctrine, and ethos.  
Their influence on the roles and missions of the Air Force and 
Ground Forces is particularly marked.  The Air Force is Israel’s 
strategic arm and controls all fixed wing aircraft, rotary aviation, 
and remotely piloted aircraft (“RPA,” the so-called “drones”); in 
contrast to the armies and navies of many other countries, their IDF 
                                                     
16 The term “strategic depth” generally refers to that part of the defenses of 
territory that lies beyond the immediate operational reach of the adversary; this 
translates into to the ability to trade space for time when defending.  MILAN VEGO, 
JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE GL–19 (2007) (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College, reprint 2009).  The lack of strategic depth has long figured 
prominently in Israeli strategic doctrine.  See, e.g., YOAV BEN-HORIN & BARRY POSEN, 
ISRAEL’S STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, 26–27 (RAND Corp. 1981) (describing Israel’s 
previous considerations of defensible borders which included the goal of creating 
borders that would provide a margin of safety and allow more flexibility of 
response). 
17 VEGO, supra note 16, at IV–52. 
9
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counterparts possess no aviation capabilities.18  Thus, only the Air 
Force can reach distant strategic targets such as the Iraqi Osirak 
nuclear facility the IDF attacked in 198119 and the Syrian nuclear 
facility struck in 2007.20  In addition to their far greater reach, air 
assets by their very nature are highly flexible tools in terms of 
reacting rapidly to a dynamic battlefield, may be easily repositioned, 
can confront threats from any direction, and can engage targets with 
great precision.  Moreover, when an air force enjoys air superiority, 
as does the Israeli Air Force, employing air power often poses less 
of a risk to those conducting an attack than in the case of ground 
forces.  Accordingly, Israel relies heavily on the Air Force to target 
adversaries in Gaza, Lebanon, and other areas close to its borders.  
The strategic role of the Israeli Air Force, when combined with 
its responsibility for simultaneously conducting theater level strikes 
and supporting ground operations, warrants a high degree of 
centralized control.  Ordinarily such control comes at the cost of 
flexibility, responsiveness, and agility.  However, given Israel’s 
small geographic size, the relative proximity of the threats it faces, 
and the Air Force’s resultant operational reach, centralized control 
makes contextual sense.21 For these and related reasons, the Israeli 
                                                     
18 See generally Itai Brun, Israeli Air Power, in GLOBAL AIR POWER 137, 137–172 
(John Andreas Olsen ed., 2011) (outlining the history of the Israeli Air Force and 
how it operated within the framework of the IDF). 
19 The strike on Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak occurred on June 7, 1981.  Israel 
justified this strike before the UN Security Council on the basis of “its inherent right 
of self-defense as understood in general international law and as preserved in 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.”  U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2280th mtg. 
at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2280 (June 12, 1981).  Israel launched the strike on a Sunday in 
order to limit collateral damage.  Yehuda Z. Blum, Letter Dated June 8, 1981 from 
the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/14510 (June 8, 1981).  
20 David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, 
Analysts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 10/14/washington/14weapons.html?. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency later confirmed the site was in fact a nuclear 
reactor.  Associated Press, IAEA Chief: Syria Tried to Build Nuclear Reactor, NBC NEWS 
(Apr. 28, 2011), http://www. nbcnews.com/id/42798472/ns/world_news-
mideast_n_africa/t/iaea-chief-syria-tried-build-nuclear-reactor/. Note that 
discussion of the Syrian strike is based on open source material, not discussions 
with IDF personnel. 
21 “Operational reach” is defined in U.S. Joint Doctrine as “the distance and 
duration across which a joint force can successfully employ its military 
capabilities.”  CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0 JOINT 
OPERATIONS III–28 (2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_03.pdf.  
That is the sense in which it is used here. 
10
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Air Force headquarters is best positioned to marshal airborne 
platforms and to direct their strikes. 
Conversely, the IDF’s Ground Forces, consisting of infantry, 
armor, and supporting arms such as artillery and combat engineers, 
are organized for the immediate defense of the Israeli homeland, as 
well as for offensive operations of a relatively limited reach beyond 
the borders of Israel.  Consequently, it operates in a decentralized 
fashion.  Geographically, the Ground Forces are organized into three 
major Regional Commands, as well as a Home Front Command 
charged primarily with civil defense.  While Israel’s relatively small 
size and interior position allow for some repositioning of forces 
when necessary to undertake major ground combat, broadly 
speaking the Southern Command is responsible for the Gaza Strip, 
the Northern Command is focused on Lebanon and the Golan 
Heights, and Central Command confronts threats arising in the 
West Bank.22  Each Regional Command in turn consists of one or 
more Divisions, which are further subdivided into Brigades, 
Battalions, and Companies.   
Unlike the U.S. all-volunteer professional military, Israeli 
citizens are conscripted into the IDF.  With a few notable exceptions, 
every Israeli male must serve a 32-month tour of duty upon reaching 
the age of 18; females serve for 28-months.23  Following active 
service, Israelis remain in the reserve forces and are subject to 
mobilization.24  This shared experience creates strong ties between 
the military and the general population and has long been viewed 
as “an essential rite of passage.”25  
Universal conscription affects Israeli values, which in turn 
influence how Israel fights.  Yagil Levy has proffered a compelling 
argument that the practice of universal conscription shapes the 
perceived value of individual Israeli soldiers, thereby creating a 
                                                     
22 See Structure of the Israel Defense Forces, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2009), 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Structure_idf.png 
(depicting the IDF force structure).  
23 Defence Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112 Art. 1, 13 (amended 1989) (Isr.), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1980-1989/pages/defence 
service law -consolidated version-- 5746-1.aspx (Art. 1 defines the military age as 
18, and Art. 13 authorizes the IDF to call conscripts to service).  
24 Id. at Art. 27. 
25 Stuart A. Cohen, The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): From a “People’s Army” to a 
“Professional Military”–Causes and Implications, 21 ARMED FORCES AND SOC’Y 237, 244 
(1995). 
11
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high degree of casualty-aversion.26  Conscription also nurtures 
republicanism, which “means that the state coercively mobilizes its 
youth in return for political and social rights accrued by the social 
networks that offer up their children to military service.”27  This 
gives the broader Israeli public a greater voice in the conduct of 
military affairs and adds weight to its demands that soldiers be 
protected and that losses be justified.28  
This attitudinal dynamic has direct operational consequences.  
Levy suggests, for example, that casualty-aversion leads the Israelis 
to liberally apply force, particularly airstrikes and counter-battery 
fire, in order to “guarantee force protection.”29  He also asserts that 
extreme sensitivity toward the well-being of its soldiers has led 
Israel to negotiate prisoner exchanges with Hezbollah and Hamas in 
which it pays a seemingly disproportionate price.30  For instance, in 
the case of Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured by Hamas in 2006, Israel 
agreed in 2011 to release over 1,000 Hamas prisoners, including 
hundreds convicted of murder.  They were released to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, where many re-engaged in combat against 
Israel.31  The contrast between this exchange and that undertaken by 
the United States for the return of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl is stark.  
Bergdahl was exchanged for five Taliban prisoners who were 
released into custody in Qatar and thus unlikely, at least in the short-
term, to return to combat against.32  
                                                     
26 DANIEL BYMAN, A HIGH PRICE 364 (2011); Yagil Levy, The Paradox of 
Recruitment, 14:2 DEFENCE STUDIES 216, 226 (2014). 
27 Levy, supra note 26, at 219. 
28 Id. at 221. 
29 Id. at 226. 
30 See RUTH LEVUSH, LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., ISRAEL: LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRISONER 
EXCHANGES 2 (2014) (observing that “[t]he rescue of those in captivity, known in 
Hebrew as pidyon sheuyim, has traditionally been considered a basic obligation 
under Jewish law and has been followed in Jewish communities for generations”). 
31 Id.; Levy, supra note 26, at 227.  See also Ronen Bergman, Gilad Shalit and the 
Rising Price of an Israeli Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/magazine/gilad-shalit-and-the-cost-of-
an-israeli-life.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the history of negotiations for Israeli 
prisoners of war). 
32 Chuck Hagel, U.S. SEC’Y OF DEF., Transfer of Five Senior Taliban Detainees, 
Address Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of 
Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense of the United States). See also Testimony of U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Hagel, House Armed Services Committee, VOICE OF AMERICA (June 
11, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/content/secretary-of-defense-chuck-hagel-
hearing-on-the-transfer-of-detainees-house-armed-services-committee/1934678. 
html (explaining the decision to transfer detainees in order to free Sergeant 
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Israeli sensitivity towards captured personnel also has direct 
operational consequences.  In 1986 the IDF implemented the 
“Hannibal Directive,” which reportedly states that “‘[i]n case of 
capture, the main mission becomes rescuing our soldiers from the 
captors, even at the cost of hitting or wounding our soldiers.’”33  The 
directive illustrates the extent to which the desire to deny its enemies 
the opportunity to leverage Israeli concern for the safety of its 
soldiers influences Israeli military decision-making. 
The value Israel places on its soldiers is matched by acute 
sensitivity to the daily dangers its civilian population faces.  Over 
six million of Israel’s eight million citizens live within range of 
Hamas and Hezbollah indirect fire weapons.  Over the last decade, 
suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings have also 
featured prominently in operations targeting Israeli civilians.  
Israel’s enemies, facing an overwhelmingly superior military force, 
have logically, albeit tragically and unlawfully, identified the 
civilian population as a center of gravity and regularly targeted it 
directly. 
 The perceived threat to the civilian population understandably 
lies at the heart of Israeli strategy and planning.  To neutralize the 
rocket threat, Israel has invested heavily in static defenses, including 
the Iron Dome system that has been relatively effective at preventing 
rockets from impacting in Israeli population centers.34  For instance, 
during the hostilities in 2014 the system intercepted 584 rockets; 
only 115 of the over 3,000 launched landed in populated areas.35  As 
further defense against rocket attacks, Israel has constructed an 
early warning system and an elaborate network of hardened 
                                                     
Bergdahl).  The U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report to Congress 
that concluded this prisoner swap violated the law by failing to inform Congress as 
required by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113–76, § 8111, 
128 Stat. 5, 131 (Jan. 17, 2014).  SUSAN A. POLING, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
B–326013, 4–5 (2014).  It resulted in a non-binding resolution from the U.S. House 
of Representative “condemn[ing] and disapprov[ing]” of the failure of the 
President to comply with the law.  H.R. Res. 644, 113th Cong. (2014).  
33 Levush, supra note 30, at 3; Ruth Margalit, Hadar Goldin and the Hannibal 
Directive, NEW YORKER MAG. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/ 
news-desk/hadar-goldin-hannibal-directive. 
34 Steven Erlanger, A Growing Arsenal of Homegrown Rockets Encounters Israel’s 
Iron Dome, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 9, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
07/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-missiles-iron-dome.html?_r=0 (explaining 
the expense of the Iron Dome system and the cost-benefit analysis of using it).  
35 By the Numbers, supra note 12. 
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shelters across the country.36  The IDF’s Home Front Command also 
maintains evacuation plans to support the mass relocation of Israeli 
civilians from threatened areas, as occurred in the 2006 Lebanon 
War when many Israelis moved out of the northern area of the 
country.37  Given the dramatically increased range of Hezbollah and 
Hamas rockets since then, it is an open question whether evacuation 
to “safe zones” remains a viable option for protecting the civilian 
population.   
The perception that the Israeli civilian population is at constant 
risk likewise drives IDF targeting.  Iron Dome does not intercept 
every rocket38 and Hamas fighters repeatedly infiltrate the Israeli 
border to conduct raids and kidnappings through tunnels that are 
up to three kilometers long and forty kilometers deep.  As a result, 
during Operation Protective Edge, the 2014 Israeli campaign, the 
IDF placed a high priority on the location and destruction of rockets, 
launching sites, weapons caches, and tunnels used by Hamas to 
infiltrate into Israel.  Over the course of the operation, the IDF claims 
to have destroyed hundreds of rockets and much of Hamas’ rocket 
launching infrastructure and to have discovered thirty-two 
tunnels.39   
A key feature of the operating environment that bears on how 
the IDF fights is that it does so on terrain that it knows very well.  
Israel occupied the Gaza Strip until its unilateral disengagement in 
200540 and has engaged in several operations in Gaza since then, two 
                                                     
36 Israel’s Civil Defense Law of 1951 requires all homes to include bomb 
shelters and mandates the construction of public shelters as well.  Civil Defense 
Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 72 (5711-1950/51) (Isr.).  The Israeli Home Front Command’s 
public information website also details the requirements for shelter construction.  
Bomb Shelters, HOME FRONT COMMAND, http://www.oref.org.il/11154-
en/Pakar.aspx. 
37 Amos Harel, IDF Preparing for Mass Evacuations in Case of Hezbollah Missile 
Strike, HAARETZ (May 20, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/ 
idf-preparing-for-mass-evacuations-in-case-of-hezbollah-missile-strike-1.291119#!. 
38 Erlanger, supra note 34. 
39 By the Numbers, supra note 12. 
40 The unilateral disengagement was proposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
and adopted by the Israeli Cabinet on June 6, 2004.  See ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF. THE CABINET RESOLUTION REGARDING THE DISENGAGEMENT PLAN (2004), available 
at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocumentspages/          
revised%20disengagement%20plan%206-june-2004.aspx (detailing the Israeli plan 
for withdrawing from Gaza).  See also Greg Myre, Israeli Withdrawal From Gaza 
Proceeds Faster Than Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/19/international/middleeast/20gazacnd.ht
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of which included large ground incursions.41  Southern Lebanon 
was occupied by the Israelis from 1985 to 2000,42 and Israel fought 
the 2006 Second Lebanon War in the terrain south of the Litani 
River.43  Israel continues to occupy the West Bank and Golan 
Heights.  In short, Israel benefits from an exceedingly high degree 
of situational awareness of its likely battlefields.   
Israel also boasts one of the world’s most technologically 
advanced military arsenals.  It employs advanced fighter aircraft 
and unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with state-of-the-art 
sensors and the latest precision-guided munitions.44  Additionally, 
Israel has access to an impressive human intelligence network.  One 
virtue of Israel’s unique history as the Jewish homeland has been its 
ability to draw on a diverse and multi-cultural pool of human 
capital; its Arab, Druse, and other ethnic and linguistic communities 
facilitate a deep understanding of its adversaries and enhance its 
ability to collect actionable intelligence.45  As a result of these 
technical and intelligence advantages, Israel enjoys an impressive 
military edge in conventional terms over its opponents.  
 
2.2. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Pursuit of Asymmetries 
  
Just as Israel seeks to comprehend its adversaries and adapt its 
operations to them, so too do its key opponents, especially Hamas 
and Hezbollah.  Both organizations recognize Israeli conventional 
military superiority, but equally grasp what Israel values—its 
soldiers’ well being and the security of its civilian population.  The 
                                                     
ml?ex= 1125115200&en=d8aefb293ac0e831&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (describing the 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza in 2005). 
41 Operation Cast Lead and Operation Protective Edge both involved ground 
force incursions into the Gaza Strip. 
42 See Marjorie Miller et al., Israel Leaves South Lebanon After 22 Years, L.A. TIMES 
(May 24, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/24/news/mn-33497 
(describing Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon and its eventual withdrawal). 
43 STEPHAN D. BIDDLE & JEFFREY A. FRIEDMAN, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and 
the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, STRATEGIC STUDIES 
INST., 32 (Sept. 2008). 
44 Brun, supra note 18, at 171; ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY 
FORCES IN AN ERA OF ASYMMETRIC WARS 118–119 (2006). 
45 CORDESMAN, supra note 44, at 132–33. 
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result is strategies of asymmetry that seek leverage over Israel by 
putting those values at risk.46   
Hezbollah’s tactics and strategy during 2006, for example, were 
characterized by a “hybrid warfare” approach that blended guerrilla 
tactics with conventional ones.47  The approach was designed to 
neutralize Israeli air power long enough to strike at Israel’s 
perceived weakness—the civilian population.  Rather than 
launching small-scale harassing attacks and then melting away into 
a civilian population, Hezbollah chose to employ short-range 
rockets against Israeli population centers in the north of Israel, and 
then protected these easily-concealed weapons using a layered 
ground defense designed to deny the IDF access to the launch sites.48  
The goal was to inflict pain on Israeli society, while fostering 
regional and global concern over Israel’s retaliatory strikes.  Both 
strands of the strategy were intended to create pressure on Israel to 
yield.49   
In this strategy, Hezbollah eschewed the use of its more 
powerful and longer-range rockets, because these would be 
vulnerable to Israeli airpower, as they are more easily located and 
fewer in number.50  The Israeli air campaign that would have been 
required to destroy the limited number of launchers would 
presumably have been short, thereby depriving Hezbollah of the 
time needed to marshal external political pressure on Israel.51  
Instead, Hezbollah achieved asymmetry by forcing Israel into a 
conventional ground campaign for which it found itself ill prepared.  
Its infantry and armored forces, focused as it was on low-intensity 
conflict, had slowly lost the art of combined arms fire and 
maneuvering.52  Instead, the IDF had grown reliant on precision air 
                                                     
46 See, e.g., Rockets from Gaza: Harm to Civilians from Palestinian Armed Groups’ 
Rocket Attacks, HUM. RTS. WATCH  (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/ 
84868 (detailing Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel and a number of civilian deaths 
that have resulted from them). 
47 The term “hybrid warfare” refers to the employment of conventional, 
irregular, and even terrorist tactics in combination, often simultaneously.  Frank G. 
Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, 52 JOINT FORCES Q. 34, 35 (Jan. 2009).  
Hezbollah has been singled-out as particularly adept at hybrid warfare.  Id. at 37. 
48 Biddle & Friedman, supra note 43, at 49–50. 
49 Id. at 50. 
50 Id. at 49. 
51 Id. at 50 n,101. 
52 Johnson, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
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strikes and the luxury of choosing when to fight, in order to avoid 
casualties.   
Hezbollah’s strategy was simple and elegant:  mitigate the 
effects of Israeli airpower, put up a stubborn ground defense to 
inflict heavy IDF casualties, and shower northern Israel with rockets 
that terrorize Israeli civilians.53  As a result, Israel paid a high price 
in Lebanon during the intense ground fighting.54  Many judge the 
conflict to have been a qualified Israeli defeat.  
Hamas’ tactics and strategy in the recent Gaza conflict were 
dramatically different, but also calculated to create asymmetry.  The 
Gaza Strip is an almost entirely urban battlefield.  Only 40 
kilometers long and 10 deep, Gaza is densely packed with civilians 
and civilian objects.55  Hamas exploits this reality intentionally.  
During every round of hostilities in Gaza since Israel’s unilateral 
disengagement, Hamas has fought almost exclusively from among 
the civilian population.  It employs both voluntary and involuntary 
(those taken to the target area or forced to remain there) human 
shields, conducts command and control from civilian homes, caches 
weapons in civilian property, often fails to wear uniforms or 
otherwise distinguish its fighters from civilians, prohibits or deters 
civilians from leaving areas likely to be targeted, and fires rockets 
from schools, mosques, United Nations facilities, and civilian 
residences.56 It seeks to create asymmetry by using the law, which it 
                                                     
53 See generally ANDREW EXUM, HIZBALLAH AT WAR: A MILITARY ASSESSMENT 8 
(2006) (Wash. Inst. for Near E. Policy, Policy Focus No. 63, Dec. 2006) (describing 
Hezbollah’s thought process and preparation prior to the conflict and the 
complexity of its tactics). See also BYMAN, supra note 26, at 256 (noting that as many 
as 500,000 Israelis were forced to leave their homes and another one million 
regularly hid in shelters). 
54 Exum, supra note 53, at 3. 
55 LEVY, supra note 26, at 193. 
56 Israel has put forth numerous claims of violations of the “LOAC” by Hamas, 
including deliberate rocket attacks against Israeli population centers, using civilian 
persons and objects to shield military operations, and misuse of protected property.  
See, e.g., UNRWA Strongly Condemns Placement of Rockets in School, UNRWA (July 
17, 2014), http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/                           press-releases/unrwa-
strongly-condemns-placement-rockets-school (reporting on the UNRWA’s 
condemnation of Hamas); UNRWA Condemns Placement of Rockets, For A Second 
Time, in One of its Schools UNRWA (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-condemns-placement-
rockets-second-time-one-its-schools (reporting the UNRWA’s further 
condemnation of Hamas); STATE OF ISRAEL, THE OPERATION IN GAZA: FACTUAL AND 
LEGAL ASPECTS (2009), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/jps.2010. 
XXXIX.1.186 (reporting on Hamas’ breaches of the law of armed conflict and war 
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often disregards, to counterbalance Israeli conventional 
superiority.57 
Like Hezbollah, Hamas appreciates the enormous value Israel 
places on its civilian population and soldiers.  To leverage these 
concerns to its benefit, for example, it fires rockets indiscriminately 
at Israeli civilian population centers to terrorize civilians and 
provoke an Israel military response, which the international 
community may perceive as heavy-handed.58  Hamas also 
increasingly relies on an elaborate tunnel network.  Designed to 
offset the IDF’s reliance on air power and its employment of UAVs 
for observation, the group has increasingly gone underground.59  
Some tunnels are used to infiltrate into Israel to conduct attacks or 
to overwhelm isolated IDF positions and, in particular, take 
prisoners.  Others are filled with explosives and detonated under 
IDF positions or used as “bait”, that is, designed to be discovered by 
the IDF and then detonated while its forces are inside.  Still others 
are used to move personnel and material within, to, and from Gaza.   
The description of the Israeli operating environment is 
necessarily a simplification; it does not fully capture the myriad 
nuances of this complex and evolving conflict.  The purpose was 
instead to identify those aspects of the operating environment that, 
from the Israeli perspective, may influence how IDF approaches 
targeting in light of LOAC requirements.  The perception that the 
                                                     
crimes); By the Numbers, supra note 12 (publishing the numbers associated with the 
IDF’s action against Hamas’ attacks).  The Human Rights Watch, other NGO’s, and 
the United Nations have confirmed some of these allegations.  See, e.g., Q&A: 2014 
Hostilities between Israel and Hamas, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/03/qa-2014-hostilities-between-israel-and-
hamas [hereinafter HRW Q&A].    
57 See JINSA-COMMISSIONED GAZA CONFLICT TASK FORCE, 2014 GAZA WAR 
ASSESSMENT: THE NEW FACE OF CONFLICT (Mar. 2015), http://www.jinsa.org/files/ 
2014GazaAssessmentReport.pdf [hereinafter Gaza War Assessment] (explaining 
how Hamas exploited the IDF’s respect for the rules of armed conflict by 
embedding military capabilities in densely populated civilian areas).  
58 See id., at 19–20 (stating that “Hamas provoked and exacerbated the 
destruction caused by IDF responses that incidentally resulted in collateral damage. 
At best, Hamas acted with reckless disregard for the sagety of both Israeli and 
Gazan civilians; at worst, it deliberately sought to put civilians in harm’s way.”). 
59 The Israeli government has provided detailed claims about Hamas’ tunnel 
network and its uses on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.  See generally Map 
of Rocket Launches from Gaza, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2013)  
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/FAQ/Pages/Operation-Protective-Edge-
The-facts.aspx#blank.  
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Israeli civilian population is at constant risk, the high value placed 
on the security of individual IDF soldiers and the adaptive, and 
asymmetric nature of the threat posed by Hamas and Hezbollah, 
taken in combination, help explain Israel’s operational dilemmas 
and, at least in part, its positions on the LOAC applicable to 
targeting. 
 
3.  IDF TARGETING PROCESSES 
 
Since Israeli ground and air forces fulfill dissimilar roles and are 
accordingly organized differently, they both employ distinct 
approaches to the targeting process.  The way in which the IDF 
engages in targeting in turn drives the manner in which legal advice 
is provided to critical decision-makers.  
Before turning to the topic of targeting processes, a cautionary 
note is required.  The procedures set forth apply to typical military 
strikes. However, in certain circumstances an attack (or a series of 
attacks) may be especially sensitive, for instance because there is 
likely to be high collateral damage, the target is politicized, the strike 
will occur on another State’s territory, or it takes place during a 
period in which high-intensity hostilities are not underway.  In these 
situations, the political leadership may be involved in the approval 
process.  If so, the Attorney General or a member of her staff, the 
Military Advocate General or a member of the International Law 
Department, operations officers, and anyone else needed to explain 
the proposed strike may be called on to assist political leaders in 
assessing it prior to approval.   
 
3.1. Ground Forces 
 
Given their geographic focus, Israeli ground forces must excel at 
understanding and developing their local environment in order to 
engage primarily dynamic or emerging targets, called Time Critical 
Targets (“TCTs”) in IDF parlance.  These are targets that suddenly 
present themselves and have to be struck in real-time, as opposed to 
pre-planned targets identified in advance of the operation.  Because 
Israel’s enemies often fight from urban areas and civilian structures, 
many IDF targets are TCTs.  Indeed, former MAG officers recounted 
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circumstances in which most of the preplanned targets were quickly 
exhausted in the early days of a conflict and operations came to be 
almost entirely dedicated to striking dynamic and emerging targets.  
The Authors visited the Southern Command’s Gaza Division 
headquarters to observe the IDF’s methodology for engaging TCTs.  
The approach is centered on “Attack Cells” at the Division level and 
Regional Commands.60  These cells provide the Division the capacity 
to conduct simultaneous real-time targeting in a decentralized 
manner that allows it to maintain speed and flexibility.  The concept 
of a special targeting cell operating out of a tactical headquarters is 
not novel.  In the U.S. system, each joint force commander fields 
some type of targeting cell in which real-time intelligence is fused 
and presented to a staff cell that brings together artillery, aviation, 
and air force officers to locate, verify, and strike multiple targets.61  
At the Brigade level and below, these generally take the form of 
large staff cells that process all targets to be engaged by that echelon 
of command.62  The IDF has simply taken this concept and adapted 
it to the specific military problem it faces in the Gaza Strip.  Rather 
than having one large targeting cell, IDF Divisions use multiple 
smaller Attack Cells that are task-organized to confront specific 
threats or take on discrete missions with a wide degree of autonomy.  
The IDF would not reveal the exact number of cells that any 
particular Division employs, but suggested that a Division has the 
capability to stand up as many as needed for the particular conflict.  
Every cell is assigned specific missions, based on such factors as 
weapons platforms, operational and maneuver boundaries, or 
specific threats.  Some cells may control weapons platforms of all 
types, but only for a specified area of operations, while others are 
charged with locating and targeting a specific enemy threat, such as 
rocket launchers and rocket firing positions or command and 
control nodes.  For air assets, the cell coordinates with its targeting 
                                                     
60 In the “IDF” Ground Force Division the Authors visited, these cells are 
colloquially known as Fire Canopies. 
61 The organizing principles for U.S. joint targeting cells are broadly described 
in CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3–60, JOINT TARGETING III-1 
(2013), available at https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chiefs-Joint_Targeting_20130131.pdf [hereinafter JP 3-60].  
62 See, e.g., ARMY TECHNIQUES PUBLICATION 3-60, TARGETING at 4–2 to -6 (2010), 
available at http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp3_60.pdf 
(detailing the Brigade Combat Team’s (“BCT”) board membership, responsibilities, 
and guidance provided by the BCT commander.) 
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counterparts at the Air Force Headquarters through an air liaison 
officer.  The mission and the operational plan will dictate how the 
Division organizes its cells, and how many it activates.  This 
approach affords the IDF a flexible and potent capability. 
Attack Cells may be as large or as streamlined as the mission 
requires, but all of them will have a certain minimum composition.  
Each is under the responsible command of one officer (the Attack 
Cell Commander), typically a Field-Grade Officer.  The Commander 
makes the ultimate decision on a strike, so long as the rules of 
engagement permit the decision to be made at this level. In some 
circumstances and with respect to certain targets, the rules of 
engagement will specify higher level authorization.  
The Commander of the cell is supported by a Targeting Officer 
capable of coordinating the specific weapons platforms needed for 
the strike, as well as by intelligence officers to manage the various 
sources of intelligence being fed to that cell.  Depending on the 
mission and organization of a particular cell, this may include visual 
intelligence (VISINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT) or human 
intelligence (HUMINT).   Operators with expertise in the weapons 
platforms at the disposal of the cell are also present.  For instance, if 
the cell employs attack aviation, a pilot may be a part of the cell, 
while those employing counter-battery artillery will have counter-
fire radar experts and artillery officers assigned.  An Operations 
Sergeant tracks the cell’s activities.  Attack cells regularly receive 
training in the LOAC. 
The most prominent characteristic of the Attack Cells is the 
decentralized nature of the targeting decisions.  Multiple cells have 
the authority to coordinate and direct strikes using the available 
weapons platforms.  Because the number, composition, and mission 
of these cells varies based on the operation, and because cells 
operate autonomously, it is essential that Cell Commanders be well-
versed in the Rules of Engagement, LOAC, and any specified 
precautionary measures that are required before strikes are 
executed.   
IDF lawyers directly advise the Division Commander, but not 
the Attack Cell commanders, a significant point in light of the 
decentralized nature of the targeting.  To ensure compliance with 
LOAC rules, lawyers are heavily involved in developing targeting 
rules and assisting the Division Commander in overseeing Attack 
Cell operations.  Strikes that fall outside the parameters provided to 
the cell have to be elevated up the chain of command to the 
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appropriate decision-maker, who makes the final targeting decision 
with the assistance of his legal advisor.  As a general matter, 
however, IDF lawyers are not involved in individual ground force 
targeting decisions; in contrast, a U.S. targeting cell will always 
contain an embedded legal advisor.  
 
3.2. Air Forces 
 
Because of its strategic mission and operational reach, as well as 
Israel’s interior position and the proximity of threats, the IDF Air 
Force operates in a much more centralized manner.  Furthermore, in 
conjunction with the Regional Commands, it is responsible for 
developing and striking pre-planned targets.63 
The Air Force’s targeting process can roughly be broken down 
into several discrete steps: Target Development, Target Assessment, 
Pre-Strike Controls, and Strike Operations.  It must be cautioned 
that the IDF was reluctant to reveal the specific command and 
control or doctrinal decision-making processes it utilizes for air 
strikes.  Therefore, these “steps” represent the Authors’ attempt to 
categorize the various activities performed during the deliberate 
targeting process, as explained by the IDF.64  
 
3.2.1. Target Development 
 
Target development is concerned with identifying what to attack.  
The central feature of the process is the “Target Bank,” a master list 
of pre-planned targets developed by IDF commanders to achieve 
desired operational effects it anticipates needing.   Like any other 
advanced military, the IDF is constantly engaged in developing war 
plans for a variety of future contingencies, even during peacetime.  
                                                     
63 See generally Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research, Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare 
(Yoram Dinstein gen. ed. 2013) [hereinafter AMW Manual] (restating the law of air 
warfare). 
64 In actual fact, the “IDF” process employs a total of ten discrete steps, but all 
of them are captured under the four broad categories we describe here. See Gaza 
War Assessment, supra note 57, at 22(detailing the process by which IDF adheres to 
LOAC).  
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When hostilities break out, additional pre-planned targets are 
developed in an expedited fashion and added to the Target Bank.   
The target development process begins with a review of a target 
in light of the mission objectives.  In this phase, planners identify the 
desired effect they need to achieve.  For instance, must the target be 
destroyed or merely degraded to achieve the desired effect?  Or, 
must a line of communication such as a road or airfield be rendered 
permanently unusable or only taken out of use for a specific period 
of time?  This process also determines the “uncertainty” 
surrounding the target.  How specific is the intelligence in terms of 
geographic and temporal certainty?  What intelligence gaps remain 
and how may the intelligence taskings be refined to resolve doubt?  
During target development, strike planners consider the specific 
target geometry and what would be required to achieve the desired 
operational effect.  Planners may also outline in general terms 
whether a target should be struck by day or night.  Finally, the time 
sensitivity of the target is examined.  When during the campaign 
must the target be attacked to achieve the desired operational effect?  
Can the target be re-attacked later if the initial attack fails to achieve 
the desired effect?  
IDF lawyers figure heavily in this process.  Once planners 
identify and propose targets based on anticipated or actual missions 
and operational goals, lawyers from the International Law 
Department (ILD, discussed below) review each.  When hostilities 
break out, the ILD is augmented by a group of additional LOAC 
experts, including both active duty and reserve officers; this 
combined entity is known as the Operational Law Apparatus (OLA) 
and is commanded by the head of the Department.  With sensitivity 
to policy and operational considerations, members of the OLA first 
determine whether the proposed target qualifies as a “military 
objective,” a term defined below.   It is during this review, and 
especially for fixed targets such as command and control nodes, 
critical lines of communication, arms caches, or fixed military 
facilities, that possible proportionality concerns (also discussed 
below) are highlighted.   
MAG officers utilize a detailed checklist to perform the legal 
review of the proposed strike (Appendix I).  Based on this initial 
assessment, each target is designated as “Approved,” 
“Conditional,” or “Not Approved.”  “Approved” means that it is a 
military objective and may be struck, subject to the rule of 
proportionality and the taking of required precautions in attack, 
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legal requirements that will be developed in Part IV.  A 
“Conditional” target is a military objective, which may be lawfully 
attacked provided certain precedential conditions are met.65  For 
example, if the target is a road or bridge used by the civilian 
population, the condition may be that it only be struck at night when 
civilians are not present and the rule of proportionality is unlikely 
to be violated.  Similarly, the condition may be that civilians be 
evacuated from the target area prior to attack to ensure the strike 
complies with the proportionality rule.  Targets that are “Not 
Approved” are those that the initial review determines do not meet 
the military objective criteria.  For instance, the OLA may decide that 
insufficient information exists to conclude a civilian residence is 
presently being used for military purposes and that, therefore, it 
does not qualify as a military objective.  Or the OLA may conclude 
that the rule of proportionality will certainly be violated because the 
expected collateral damage is excessive to the military advantage 
anticipated to accrue from the attack, irrespective of how and when 
it is struck.   Such targets may not be attacked over the objection of 
the legal officers. 
 
3.2.2. Target Assessment 
 
Whereas target development is concerned with determining 
what to attack, target assessment focuses on how and when to attack.  
The target assessment phase begins when a target enters the Target 
Bank and continues through the post-strike phase as Battle Damage 
Assessments (BDA) and debriefings are conducted.  Many of the 
activities described in this phase may have already occurred once, 
in at least a rudimentary way, during Target Development.  In 
Target Assessment, these steps are re-addressed in a refined way.  
Therefore, Target Assessment is less a “step” or “phase” in the 
targeting process than a component in a continuous loop of 
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.   
During Target Assessment, planners again identify any specially 
protected persons or objects under the LOAC, like medical facilities, 
that are in the target area and assess the likelihood of collateral 
damage to civilian persons or objects that may result.  They also 
                                                     
65 Gaza War Assessment, supra note 57, at 22, (referring to the “conditional” 
approval of a target as “qualified;” the meaning is the same).  
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designate “dead-space” near the target that is relatively free of 
civilians and important civilian property, such as an abandoned 
building or an open area in a depression.  The dead spaces are noted 
for possible use during execution of the strike as a location towards 
which a steerable weapon such as a laser-guided missile may be 
diverted to limit unanticipated collateral damage.  IDF lawyers in 
the OLA provide around-the-clock advice to planners and 
commanders as they refine target intelligence to ensure compliance 
with the LOAC. 
This situational understanding informs the weaponeering 
process, which in the IDF is elaborate and sophisticated.  Broadly 
speaking, “weaponeering” is the selection of the means (weapon) 
and method (tactic) that will be employed to attack a particular 
target.  Effective weaponeering is as much a military art as it is a 
military science.66   
During weaponeering, expert planners adjust the munition, the 
delivery platform, the angle of attack, and other physical variables 
in order to best achieve the desired military effect while complying 
with the LOAC requirement to minimize or eliminate collateral 
damage to protected persons and property.  For instance, the IDF 
often employs specially configured smaller warheads with reduced 
explosive material against targets in urban areas to limit collateral 
damage.   Other warheads have been re-engineered to generate 
lighter fragments upon detonation so that the fragments travel 
shorter distances from the point of impact.  Additionally, pilots and 
operational planners with training in physics and aerodynamics 
determine the appropriate angle of attack – the vector upon which 
munitions will be released from attack platforms—in order to direct 
the blast away from nearby civilian persons or objects while 
achieving the desired effect.  Of particular note is the fact that, 
whenever feasible, the IDF uses engineers alongside munitions 
experts and pilots to better understand the impact of an attack on 
structures.  Operating as a team, the various participants can assess 
such issues as the penetrating characteristics and explosive effects of 
the weapons in the context of particular targets, the accuracy needed 
to achieve the desired destructive effect, the fusing that will ensure 
                                                     
66 See JP 3–60, supra note 61, at GL–11(defining weaponeering as “the process 
of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal means required 
to create a desired effect on a given target.”). 
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warheads detonate in such a way as to contain and direct the blast, 
and the effects of weather and other variables.  
Finally, the IDF has adapted to fight under the particular 
circumstances it faces – combat in urban terrain against an 
adversary that routinely fails to distinguish itself from the civilian 
population and uses that population and civilian objects to shield its 
forces and operations from attack.   Since the IDF is not 
expeditionary, the IDF has been able to develop a deep 
understanding of the most likely theaters of operations—Gaza, 
Lebanon and the West Bank.  For instance, its planners have a 
granular appreciation of such critical targeting matters as the usual 
pattern of civilian life in the target area, construction materials used 
to build homes and other structures, and the load-bearing capacity 
of roads and bridges.  It is therefore especially well equipped to 
precisely identify the required destructive capacity of the weapons 
it employs against particular targets and the likely collateral damage 
that will result from an attack.  
 
 
3.2.3. Pre-Strike Controls  
 
Targets that have been developed and assessed remain in the 
Target Bank until the decision is made to strike a target.  At that 
point, additional pre-strike controls are implemented.  The target is 
re-verified – appropriate intelligence assets and other observation 
platforms confirm the location of the target and that it remains a 
valid military objective susceptible to attack.  Pre-strike controls 
include reassessment of the initial proportionality review conducted 
during target development, since changes in the military situation 
may decrease the military advantage anticipated or the previously 
unidentified presence of protected persons or objects in the target 
area might increase expected collateral damage.  Proportionality is 
monitored, to the extent feasible, until the moment of weapons 
release.  If significant new intelligence surfaces, a reassessment all 
relevant officers involved in the targeting process, including the 
legal advisor, is required.  
Whenever feasible, the IDF employs various precautions aimed 
at avoiding, or at least minimizing, the collateral damage expected 
from the attack.  These precautions may include, for example, visual 
26
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3
 
2015] TYRANNY OF CONTEXT 79 
 
observation by an RPA.  This enables movable targets to be tracked 
and facilitates the identification of civilians and civilian objects that 
may have come into the target area unexpectedly in order to cancel, 
divert, or modify a strike if necessary based on legal or rules of 
engagement concerns.  Operators also attempt to maintain 
observation of previously identified “dead-space” to maintain 
whether its use remains viable if needed.  
When civilians may be affected by an attack and it is militarily 
feasible to do so, the IDF undertakes extensive measures to warn 
them.67  Some, such as leaflet drops and general announcements to 
the civilian population, are common in conflicts.  It typically 
announces that a particular area will be subject to attack and instruct 
the population where to go to avoid its effects.  In many cases, the 
IDF contacts neighborhood leaders and ask them to encourage 
civilians to leave the area.  The IDF also delivers very precise 
warnings of particular strikes.  As described below, these include 
direct phone communications with civilians in the target area and 
so-called “knocks on the roof.” Human rights organizations 
criticized both of the latter techniques during the recent Israeli 
operation in Gaza, although the Authors did not find the criticism 
well-grounded.68   
To conduct the phone warnings, the IDF employs a specialized 
team of trained personnel who run a “phone bank” with the sole 
purpose of contacting individuals who might be affected by a strike.  
The calls are in some cases extremely precise.  For instance, the 
warning may be that a strike will occur at a specified time.  Live 
operators make some phone warnings, while others consist of 
                                                     
67 See, e.g., How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?, OFFICIAL BLOG 
ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (July 16, 2014), http://www.idfblog.com/blog/ 
2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilians-gaza/ (explaining the ways that 
Israel warns civilians of imminent bomb attack, including: by phone, leaflets, and 
roof-knocking).  
68 See, e.g., Israel/Palestine: Unlawful Israeli Airstrikes Kill Civilians, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH  (July 16, 2014) http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/15/israelpalestine-
unlawful-israeli-airstrikes-kill-civilians (alleging that IDF warnings were not 
effective because, in many cases, civilians were not given sufficient time to respond 
to them before the attack occurred).  With respect to the “knock on the roof,” 
Amnesty International objects, stating that “there is no way that firing a missile at 
a civilian home can constitute an effective warning.” Israel/Gaza: U.N. Must Impose 
Arms Embargo and Mandate an International Investigation as Civilian Death Toll Rises, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,  (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/ israelgaza-un-must-impose-
arms-embargo-and-mandate-an-international-investigation-as-civilian-death.  
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generic pre-recorded messages.  The personnel in the warning cell 
speak Arabic fluently, have received cultural training on the civilian 
population in the target area, and whenever feasible, use all-source 
fused intelligence to focus on specific individuals who might be at 
risk.  For example, understanding Palestinian culture and family 
structures, the warning cell may try to contact the male head of a 
family in a particular apartment building, knowing that he will 
effectively disseminate the warning to other family members.  If a 
minor or a female answers the phone call, the warning cell attempts 
to speak to the head of the family.  When several buildings in a 
particular area are targeted, the warning cell may also contact a local 
civilian official or an informal community leader who will be able to 
spread the warning effectively and insist on obedience.   
The IDF developed the controversial “knock on the roof” 
technique for use when other warnings go unheeded or are 
infeasible.69  The technique involves employing small sub-munitions 
that impact one corner of the roof and detonates a very small 
explosion that produces noise and concussion several minutes in 
advance of the strike.  The civilians are hopefully frightened into 
dispersing.  Once it has cleared the target area, the IDF launches the 
attack.70 
 
3.2.4. Strike Operations   
 
                                                     
69 This technique was heavily criticized in the “Goldstone Report.” See Human 
Rights Council, Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, Human Rights in Palestine 
and other Occupied Arab Territories, ¶¶ 532–535, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 
2009) at, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ 
12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf [hereinafter Goldstone Report] (criticizing the roof-
knocking warning as ineffective because citizens should not have to guess what the 
warning means and may be potentially terrorized by the warning).  
70 See LEVY, supra note 26, at 196–97 (describing the knock on the roof 
technique).  Video footage of the knock on the roof being delivered has been made 
publicly available.  The Authors also viewed a number of these videos.  In one, 
highlighted by the IDF as an optimal example, the IDF delivered a sub-munition in 
a location on the roof where it did no harm to civilians.  An RPA was employed to 
observe each of the civilians clearing the target.  Once the civilians were accounted 
for away, the building was destroyed.  Adam Taylor, Video: This is what an Israeli 
‘roff knock’ looks like, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/14/video-
this-is-what-an-israeli-roof-knock-looks-like/.  
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Target development, target assessment, and pre-strike controls 
continue until the moment of attack.  The final decision to strike is 
generally made at a high level in the Air Force Headquarters, where 
a robust operations center monitors each target through strike 
execution.  Pilots retain the discretion to abort a mission if their own 
observation of the target indicates that the unanticipated presence 
of civilians or civilian objects in the target area requires the attack to 
be cancelled on the basis of a change in proportionality.  The IDF 
stresses this responsibility, and the responsibility to take feasible 
precautions in attack, to pilots in their training. 
During interviews, IDF personnel cautioned that the operations 
center often enjoys a better situational awareness of the target area 
than the pilot.  Whereas the pilot is limited to onboard sensors and 
external feeds available in the aircraft, the operations center 
generally enjoys a refined and stable visual picture of the target area 
from RPA coverage and benefits from all-source intelligence fusion 
capability.  Thus, unless a pilot personally observes indicators that 
raise doubt about the target, he or she is entitled to rely on the 
discretion of the operations center in executing the strike. 
The ultimate measure of control for air operations lies in the 
senior decision-makers in the air operations center.  While the IDF 
did not consent to public identification of the individuals who 
exercise this authority, it can be described as a cadre of very senior 
decision-makers with extensive experience, training, and robust 
support from intelligence analysts, weaponeering experts and legal 
advisors.  During the Authors’ interviews of senior IDF leaders, it 
became clear that they are acutely aware of the scrutiny their attacks 
receive and of their legal obligations.  Indeed, in many cases they 
disapprove of what are clearly lawful strikes on the basis that the 
advantage likely to be gained is outweighed by potential negative 
repercussions in the public information and strategic 
communications arena (the so-called “CNN effect”), or based on 
broader policy concerns that factor heavily in their decisions.  
Immediately following an attack, the pilot, as well as ground 
observers and other intelligence sources, conduct an assessment of 
the strike’s effects, both in terms of Battle Damage Assessment and 
collateral damage.  This assessment feeds a “lessons learned” 
process in which tactics, munitions, and the effectiveness of various 
intelligence sources are analyzed and, when necessary, adjusted to 
facilitate greater precision and better effects, as well as decreased 
collateral damage, in subsequent attacks.  
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4.  THE MILITARY ADVOCATE GENERAL CORPS 
 
Members of the Military Advocate General Corps, headed by the 
Military Advocate General (MAG), are integral to the targeting 
process.71 The MAG consists of approximately 1000 lawyers, 
roughly 300 of whom are active duty.  From this pool of military 
lawyers, several dozen are selected to form the Operational Law 
Apparatus, which, as described below, provides level advice during 
the targeting process.  Therefore, the composition and functions of 
the MAG Corps are highly relevant to the IDF’s application of, and 
compliance with, LOAC norms, both generally and with respect to 
individual strikes.72 
Broadly speaking, the MAG Corps consists of three 
“professional systems.” “Law Enforcement” performs military 
justice functions, and, of particular note with regard to targeting, 
includes a team specially dedicated to Operational Matters that, 
inter alia, handles incidents during combat.  It advises the MAG on 
whether to go forward with investigations into possible LOAC 
violations and how their results should be handled.  Should the 
MAG decide to indict the individual(s) involved, MAG officers 
assigned to the Law Enforcement system would conduct the 
prosecution and provide defense services.  However, the military 
courts are not under the control of the MAG. 
                                                     
71 The purpose, structure, and functions of the Corps are set forth in Military 
Justice Law and in Supreme Command Order no. 2.0613, THE MILITARY ADVOCATE–
GENERAL’S CORPS (Mar. 15, 1976) [hereinafter SCO 2.0613]. See also Supreme 
Command Order no. 2.0201, THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF IN THE GENERAL STAFF (Aug. 1, 
1966); MAG’S HEADQUARTERS’ INTERNAL REGULATIONS; and THE ORGANIZATIONAL 
ORDER OF THE MAG HEADQUARTERS (July 2008) (constituting other relevant 
directives).  An extensive discussion of the Corps is contained in The Public 
Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, 2D REPORT, ISRAEL’S 
MECHANISMS FOR EXAMINING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS AND CLAIMS OF 
VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Feb. 2013) [hereinafter Turkel Commission Report].  
72 With respect to the material that follows, the Authors conducted extensive 
interviews with MAG personnel, including the Military Advocate General, were 
briefed by MAG personnel, and were permitted to review various documents by 
the IDF. See also Turkel Commission Report, supra note 71, at 279–290 (discussing 
“the mechanisms in Israel that examine and investigate complaints and claims of 
violations of international humanitarian law”).  
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The “Legal Advice” component consists of the Departments for 
Advice and Legislation, Judea and Samaria (West Bank), and 
International Law.  Of these, the International Law Department 
(ILD) has primary responsibility for legal policy issues regarding 
international law, such as the use of particular weapons and tactics 
and the legality of particular categories of targets, as well as the 
interpretation and application of the LOAC during hostilities.  MAG 
officers assigned to ILD are involved in preparing relevant 
operational plans, including the legal annexes thereto, and 
operation-specific rules of engagement (ROE).  Lawyers reporting to 
the Chief of ILD serve with field units at the Division level and 
provide legal advice to the Air Force during the targeting process.  
As previously discussed, ILD is augmented during hostilities with 
additional active duty and reserve LOAC experts to create the 
“Operational Law Apparatus” (reservists remain subordinate to the 
active duty MAG officers, irrespective of rank, when rendering legal 
advice on operational matters).  The OLA was established 
doctrinally in 2007 following the Second Lebanon War and first 
employed during Operation Cast Lead in 2009.  Prior to that time, 
MAG officers were present only in certain units.  Today, at least 
three legal advisers will be assigned to every Division engaged in 
combat.  All those who serve in a supplementary role receive 
operational law training conducted jointly by ILD and the MAG 
School.  
It is noteworthy that military justice and operational law 
functions are stove-piped; it is only at the level of the MAG that 
lawyers performing the two functions report to the same officer.  
This ensures that those providing advice to the MAG on how to 
handle a questionable incident are not in the chain of command of 
anyone involved in the situation. 
The third professional system is “Training and Research.”  In 
addition to their formal academic education as lawyers, which 
sometimes includes postgraduate education at top tier law schools, 
MAG officers benefit from training at the Military Law School.  The 
School plays a central role in the ability of the MAG Corps to 
provide quality legal advice during targeting operations.  The 
School’s basic curriculum provides MAG officers a heavy dose of 
LOAC, while specialized LOAC courses include a combination of 
classroom work and practical exercises.  The Authors had the 
opportunity to meet with most members of the International Law 
Department regarding substantive legal issues and were struck by 
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their grasp of the nuances of LOAC, in particular its practical 
application.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Treaty74 and customary law75 mandate LOAC training for all 
members of the armed forces, a requirement that is mirrored in IDF 
                                                     
73 The organizational chart is based on materials provided to the Authors by 
the IDF.  
74 See, e.g., Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 48, Aug. 
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 127, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 144, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC I, GC II, GC III, and GC IV, respectively]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 83, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international 
Armed Conflicts, art. 19 June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
art. 25 May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 
1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 30, 
Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; and Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on 
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, art. 6, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter CCW].  
75 See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (“ICRC”), CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW  142  (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 
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regulations.76  The MAG School provides non-MAG officers 
instruction in general LOAC principles, targeting, measures of 
special protection, enemy property, enemy civilian property, 
humanitarian obligations towards the civilian population, 
command responsibility, prisoners of war, weapons, and 
occupation law.  As the chart below indicates, such training is 
tailored to rank, responsibility, and function.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study] (outlining the commentary to Rule 6, which states 
“Civilians are protected against, attack, unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities”). 
76 IDF General Staff Order 33.0133, Discipline–Acting in Accordance with 
International Conventions to which the State of Israel is Party (July 20, 1982), ¶¶ 6–
7. 
77 The chart depicting the legal training provided to IDF officers was created 
by the IDF School of Military Law and given to the Authors by the IDF.  
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The Minister of Defense appoints the Military Advocate General, 
a General officer in rank, based on the IDF Chief of General Staff’s 
recommendation.  A Military Justice Law designates the MAG as 
legal adviser to the Chief of General Staff and other senior military 
authorities.78  Although subordinate to the Chief militarily, he is 
technically “subordinate” only to the law.  His decisions bind the 
IDF on operational law issues, including those related to targeting, 
and must be implemented.  In matters of law regarding IDF 
operations, the MAG answers only to the Attorney General.79 This 
is an exceptional degree of authority over legal matters.  For 
instance, legal opinions of judge advocates in the U.S. system do not 
bind those involved in the targeting process, although, of course, 
commanders and others who disregard the advice of their judge 
advocates do so at their own peril.   
Independence from the operational command structure is 
mirrored throughout the MAG Corps.  Unlike many other countries, 
including the United States, the chain of command for IDF lawyers 
lies solely within the MAG Corps.  Of special significance is the fact 
that MAG officers are not subordinate to the military commanders 
they support during combat operations.  Instead, they report to the 
International Law Department and ultimately the MAG.80  This 
structure, at least in theory, affords them objectivity and 
independence when providing legal advice to commanders and 
others regarding targeting.  
The near-total separation of MAG officers from the operational 
chain of command is striking.  In the U.S. armed forces, judge 
advocates providing legal advice on targeting matters are typically 
assigned to the unit conducting or overseeing the strikes and report 
to the commander thereof.  Unit membership is seen as enhancing 
their effectiveness in the fast-paced, high-stress, and deadly 
targeting environment.  JAGs are considered team members who 
contribute to the commander’s goals while ensuring the operations 
remain within legal bounds, rather than outsiders who monitor 
operations.  Thus, commanders and other operators generally feel 
as comfortable being open with “their” lawyers as with any other 
                                                     
78 SCO 2.0613, supra note 71, at ¶ 4; The Military Justice Law, 4715–1955, 9 LSI 
184 (4714-1955/56 as amended) (Isr.), art. 178. 
79 SCO 2.0613, supra note 71, at ¶ 9(a). 
80 SCO 2.0613, supra note 71, ¶ 10.  
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staff officer.   This serves to offset the fact that the decisions of U.S. 
JAGs do not bind their commanders. 
IDF lawyers appear not to benefit to the same extent as their U.S. 
counterparts from this dynamic.  Additionally, the Authors found 
the degree of confidence of the commanders interviewed, including 
a commander of a ground targeting cell, in their own ability to 
understand and apply the LOAC in one of the world’s most complex 
operational environments somewhat surprising.  Obviously, 
commanders need to command and must have a firm grasp of the 
law to do so effectively.  The Authors nevertheless concluded that 
IDF commanders would benefit from a better grasp of the 
contribution MAG officers can make to mission accomplishment at 
all levels of warfare.    
By being outside the operational chain of command, MAG 
officers are more immune to the periodic inclination to tell the 
commander “what he wants to hear.”  If such pressure arises, it is 
positive in the sense that the “boss” is a lawyer who will assess the 
officer on the basis of his or her effectiveness in rendering legal 
advice, including the accuracy of legal assessments.  Moreover, the 
Israeli system incentivizes following the MAG officer’s advice.  
Since the MAG is less an adviser than a staff officer who renders 
binding legal decisions, IDF commanders have no option but to 
follow the advice of their lawyers.  In the event of disagreement in 
the field or Air Force Headquarters, the commander may elevate the 
issue up the chain of command.  But, ultimately the MAG’s decision 
is, subject to the Attorney General’s oversight, final.  This system 
contributes to compliance with the law even in situations in which 
doing so might be counter-intuitive from an operational 
perspective.   
A further benefit of the stove-piped nature of IDF legal advice is 
that since MAG officers report up MAG channels, the commander 
can expect that potential LOAC violations will be promptly 
reported; in other words, the system incentivizes, rather than 
disincentives, the reporting of questionable incidents.  Commanders 
cannot be oblivious to this reality.  Obviously, the MAG’s right to 
initiate investigations makes such reporting particularly 
meaningful. 
The MAG Corps enjoys a great deal of authority over, and 
responsibility for, investigations and prosecutions of those 
suspected of LOAC violations.  In light of the recent accession of the 
Palestinian Authority to the Rome Statute, the timeliness and quality 
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of this process is of critical importance due to the principle of 
complementarity, which may provide an effective shield against 
International Criminal Court prosecution of Israeli military 
personnel.81  
Unlike the U.S. military, in which military law enforcement 
officials and specified commanders perform investigative and 
judicial oversight functions, albeit with the advice of judge 
advocates, the MAG operates autonomously.  As a result, in part, of 
the 2013 Turkel Commission report into the IDF’s procedures for 
investigation and prosecution of LOAC violations, the IDF system 
has been recently revised.82  Information regarding possible LOAC 
violations must be forwarded to the MAG.  The MAG has three 
options at that point.  First, he may decide there is no basis for 
suspicion that criminal activity has occurred and close the case.  
Second, the MAG may conclude there is reason to suspect that the 
incident involved a LOAC violation and direct a criminal 
investigation.  The investigation’s results are provided to the MAG, 
who then must decide to close the case, to forward the results to the 
command for disciplinary measures, or to indict those involved.  
Third, the MAG may employ a new procedure, the Fact Finding 
Assessment (FFA) Mechanism.83  The purpose of the FFA is to 
                                                     
81 The principle of complementarity is enshrined in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute], which requires the ICC to find a case “inadmissible” if a State with 
competent jurisdiction over the offenses has investigated and prosecuted the case, 
or (having investigated) has made an affirmative decision not to prosecute. 
82 The Prime Minister appointed the Turkel Commission in June 2010 to 
examine a May 2010 incident involving a Turkish vessel that had been forcefully 
boarded by the IDF in order to enforce its blockade of Gaza. Although the 
Commission generally sanctioned the system in its first report, the Commission 
continued its work to specifically address “whether the mechanism for examining 
and investigating complaints and claims raised in relation to violations of the laws 
of armed conflict . . . conforms with the obligations of the State of Israel under the 
forces of international law.”  See Turkel Commission Report, supra note 71, at ¶ 13.  
Accordingly, the Commission issued a second report in February 2013, which made 
a number of recommendations, some of which have been implemented. 
83 See Fact-Finding Assessment: Operation Protective Edge, OFFICIAL BLOG ISRAEL 
DEFENSE FORCES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/09/12/idf-
conducts-fact-finding-assessment-following-operation-protective-edge/ (detailing 
how exceptional incidents examined by the FFA are instances where the MAG 
requires additional informal to determine if there are reasonable grounds for a 
violation.)  See also Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General Regarding 
Exceptional Incidents that Occurred during Operation Protective Edge – Update No. 2, 
OFFICIAL BLOG ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.law.idf.il/163-
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conduct a speedy review of incidents using expeditious procedures 
to assess whether there may be grounds to suspect a criminal 
violation meriting further action by the MAG.  If the MAG 
concludes, based on initial reports, that a violation of LOAC may 
have occurred but wants to clarify the situation before ordering a 
criminal investigation, he may direct an FFA.  The FFA teams, which 
are led by a Major General and include primarily high-ranking 
reservist officers with operational and legal backgrounds, examine 
the circumstances of an incident (even as operations are on-going), 
albeit neither in the same depth as a criminal investigation, nor 
using formal criminal investigatory procedures.  Based on the FFA 
report, the MAG may close the case, send the report to the command 
to take disciplinary measures, or direct that a criminal investigation 
be opened.84  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6958-en/Patzar.aspx (providing further detail on FFA investigations by listing 
specific exceptional instances in question.) 
84 Information supporting the diagram depicting the investigations process 
was provided to the Authors by the IDF. 
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With respect to Operation Protective Edge, the MAG has, as of 
March 22, 2015, directed 126 FFAs.  Sixty-five have been completed.  
Of the remaining 61 cases, the MAG has closed 17 reviews, criminal 
investigations were ordered following 6 assessments, and 38 
examinations remain underway.85  Unfortunately, the MAG has 
been criticized for these efforts on the basis that IDF soldiers are 
often conscripts with no choice but to serve in the military and that 
it is unfair to subject them to investigation and prosecution.86  Such 
criticism is off-base from a practical point of view because a well-
disciplined army is always more effective than an ill-disciplined 
one.  It also runs counter to the commitment to the rule of law 
professed by Israel. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of legal involvement in IDF 
operational matters is Israeli judicial scrutiny of ongoing operations.  
In most other countries, including the United States, judicial branch 
oversight of the executive branch’s’ military activities, especially in 
the midst of an armed conflict, is rare.  To the extent such oversight 
exists, it usually occurs post factum and is seldom a consideration for 
field commanders engaged in combat operations. 
By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court 
of Justice has the power to issue decisions on the lawfulness of 
particular tactics.87  This authority is especially significant given the 
                                                     
85 IDF Military Advocate, Decisions of the IDF Military Advocate General 
regarding Exceptional Incidents during Operation ‘Protective Edge - Update No. 3 (Mar. 
22, 2015), http://www.law.idf.il/163-7183-en/Patzar.aspx. 
86 See Associated Press, Israeli Military Divided Over Gaza War Probes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/01/06/world/                
middleeast/ap-ml-israel-war-probes.html?_r=0 (describing the disagreement 
within the Israeli military over whether or not to hold soldiers legally responsible 
for their actions in the hostilities in the Gaza war); Amos Harel, Preempting The 
Hague: How the IDF Seeks to Avoid International Legal Action, HAARETZ (Jan. 3, 2015), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.635021 (looking at how the 
IDF is using internal procedures to try to preclude international legal action against 
its soldiers). 
87 When the Supreme Court sits as the High Court of Justice (“HCJ”), it 
hears petitions brought against government actions. It is a court of first and last 
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Israeli judicial system’s liberal approach to standing which extends, 
for instance, to public petitions by human rights organizations such 
as the Association of Civil Rights in Israel and B’Tselem.  The 
Supreme Court exercises this power regularly.  It has, for example, 
rendered numerous decisions regarding detention,88 outlawed the 
use of neighbors to warn residents of homes in which terrorists are 
about to be arrested,89 dealt with weapons such as artillery,90 
flechettes,91 and white phosphorus,92 and addressed the demolition 
of homes of those suspected of terrorist activities.93  
                                                     
instance. Jurisdiction of the “HCJ” is provided for in section 15 of the Basic Law: 
Judiciary, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101 (1984) (Isr.). According to the Israeli doctrine of 
standing, individuals may petition the court when they can show that conduct by 
the executive branch denies them a legally protected right., HCJ 8091/14 Center for 
the Defence of the Individual et al. v. Minister of Defense et al. [2014]. Since Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the “HCJ” has reviewed actions of 
the military authorities in these territories. A Palestinian first brought a petition 
against the West Bank’s military commander in Stekol v Minister of Defence on 20 
June 1967 (unreported).  The Attorney-General did not challenge the assertion of 
jurisdiction.  See generally Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the 
Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262 (1971). Christian Society for the Holy 
Places is the first reported decision dealing with the legality of military actions in 
the occupied territories. HCJ 337/71 Christian Society for the Holy Places v. 
Minister of Defense [1971]. There the issue of jurisdiction was not raised. Id. Access 
to the Court for residents of the occupied territories comports with the general 
eradication of limitations on standing during the 1980s.  See, e.g., HCJ 910/86 Major 
(res.) Yehuda Ressler, Advocate et al v. Minister of Defence [June 12, 1988] 
(recognizing an exception to the general rule requiring petitioner to establishment 
“an interest of the past of the petitioner”).  Indeed, the Court no longer requires a 
petitioner to demonstrate a direct interest infringed by the disputed government 
conduct; it is sufficient that a public interest is implicated.  Id.  The possibility of 
appearing before the Court based on a public interest has led to frequent petitions 
by Israeli non-governmental organizations such as B'Tselem.  See generally YOAV 
DOTAN, LAWYERING FOR THE RULE OF LAW: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF 
JUDICIAL POWER IN ISRAEL 34–37 (2014). 
88 HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 15 Isr. L. Rep. 173 
[Feb. 5, 2003] (Isr).  See also CA 6659/06 A and B v. State of Israel 2008 Isr. L. Rep. 
273 [Mar. 5, 2007] (Isr) (holding that, in an appeal against the decisions of the Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa District Court, the detention of the appellants under the Internment of 
Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 was lawful). 
89 HCJ 3799/02 Adalah - The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 
v. GOC Central Command, IDF [June 23, 2005]. 
90 HCJ 3261/06 Physicians for Human Rights v. Minister of Defense [2011]. 
91 HCJ 8990/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. Doron Almog - O.C. Southern 
Command [Apr 27, 2003]. 
92 HCJ 4146/11 Yoav Hess et al v. Chief of Staff [May 13, 2013]. 
93 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual v. Minister 
of Defense [Mar. 12, 2014]. 
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In some cases, the Supreme Court acts while operations are 
underway.  For instance, it considered a petition filed during 
operations in Gaza seeking relief regarding such matters as the 
supply of electricity, food, water, and medical supplies, evacuation 
of the wounded, burial of the dead, permission for doctors to enter 
Gaza, and investigation of the alleged shelling of a civilian crowd.94  
In another case, as operations to put an end to rocket fire from Gaza 
were still ongoing, the Court examined claims that there were delays 
in evacuating the wounded to hospitals in Gaza and that the IDF 
was attacking ambulances and medical personnel.95  Perhaps most 
well-known is the so-called Targeted Killing case, in which the 
Court examined preventive strikes in Gaza and the West Bank 
against individuals planning, launching, or committing terrorist 
attacks and set forth various guidelines for conducting 
individualized anti-personnel strikes.96  
It must be emphasized that the Supreme Court’s review is not 
pro forma.  On the contrary, the Court often rejects government 
arguments, sometimes ruling against the government altogether. An 
illustration of this point involved using neighbors to warn residents 
of homes where arrests were about to occur.  In its judgment, the 
Court held that “the ‘Early Warning’ procedure is at odds with 
international law.  It comes too close to the normative ‘nucleus’ of 
the forbidden, and is found in the relatively grey area (the 
penumbra) of the improper.”97  It held as such on multiple grounds, 
including the prohibition on using an occupied territory’s 
population for military purposes, the requirement to separate 
civilians from military activities, the probability that the actions of 
the neighbors was non-consensual, and the risk to neighbors who 
convey the warnings.98  Similarly, in another case involving the 
policy of demolishing or sealing the homes of terrorists, the Court 
elected not to find the policy unlawful, but cautioned that it is such 
an exceptional measure that bringing the issue before the judiciary 
                                                     
94 HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza 2004 
Isr. L. Rep. 200 [May 30, 2004]. 
95 HCJ 201/09 Physicians for Human Rights v. Prime Minister of Israel 2009 
Isr. L. Rep. 1 [Jan. 19, 2009]. 
96 HCJ 769/02 The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The 
Government of Israel 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459 [Dec. 14, 2006]. 
97 Id., at ¶ 25. 
98 Id., at ¶ 24. 
40
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3
 
2015] TYRANNY OF CONTEXT 93 
 
on a recurring basis to ensure the continued validity of the claim of 
its deterrent effects would be appropriate.99  
The risk is that such judicial activism will have a chilling effect 
on military operations.  However, in the unique circumstances in 
which Israel finds itself, particularly the use by its enemies of 
lawfare (the use or abuse of the law by a party to the conflict in order 
to disadvantage the enemy),100 such activism arguably makes 
operational and strategic good sense.  After all, the IDF is unlikely 
to be defeated on the battlefield, but Israel does struggle to maintain 
domestic and international support, which can erode quickly if 
Israel is perceived to be acting unlawfully.  As former President of 
the Court, Justice Aharon Barak, has noted,  
Israel is not an isolated island.  It is a member of an 
international system . . . .  The combat activities of the IDF 
are not conducted in a legal void.  There are legal norms – 
some from customary international law, some from 
international law entrenched in conventions to which Israel 
is party, and some in the fundamental principles of Israeli 
law – which determine rules about how combat activities 
should be conducted.101 
Finally, the Authors met with a number of senior IDF 
commanders to discuss targeting operations.  It was apparent that 
they were highly sensitive to the reality of lawfare.  In planning and 
executing strikes, the commanders and other operators understood 
the extent to which their opponents have adopted strategies and 
tactics designed to bait them into strikes that, lawful or not, can be 
portrayed as LOAC violations to the broader community.  For this 
and other reasons (including operational and policy reasons), 
commanders sometimes refrain from conducting attacks that would 
                                                     
99 HCJ 8091/14, supra note 93, at ¶ 28. 
100 The term “lawfare” was coined by Major General Charlie Dunlap, USAF 
(ret.), former Deputy Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Air Force.  See Charles J. 
Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st 
Century Conflicts, (Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention Conference 
Working Paper), http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf (using “lawfare” 
to describe international laws that may be undercutting the ability of the United 
States to conduct effective military interventions); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare 
Today…and Tomorrow, 87 INT’L L. STUD. SER. US NAVAL WAR COL. 315 (2011) 
(defining “lawfare” as the strategy using or abusing the law in place of traditional 
military means to achieve warfighting objectives).  
101 HCJ 4764/04, supra note 94, at 391. 
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be both lawful and in accordance with the rules of engagement.  
Indeed, although the Authors were not permitted to view the 
classified rules of engagement, it was clear from their discussions 
with IDF officers that the ROE often include attack thresholds that 
are more restrictive than allowed by the law.  Commanders and 
other operators have noticeably internalized the fact that even a 
slight deviation from the dictates of the LOAC is not only risky 
personally in light of MAG Corps oversight and authority, but also 
operationally insensible.  This makes IDF commanders remarkably 
open to heeding the advice of the MAG officers involved in their 
operations. 
 
5.  IDF POSITIONS ON TARGETING LAW 
 
The first step in any LOAC analysis is typically to determine 
whether a particular situation constitutes either a non-international 
or international armed conflict.102  If it is neither, international 
human rights law and applicable domestic legal regimes will govern 
hostilities.  With respect to the two forms of armed conflict, the 
former refers to hostilities between a State and one or more 
organized armed groups, or between organized armed groups, that 
exhibit a particular level of intensity,103 whereas the latter 
                                                     
102 For a concise discussion of conflict classification, see Jelena Pejic, Status of 
Armed Conflicts, in PERSP. ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 77 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susan Breau eds., 2007). See also 
Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32 (Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (exploring the distinction between international and non-
international armed conflicts); Sylvain Vite,́ Typology of Armed Conflicts in 
International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 69 (2009) (discussing how the different categories of armed conflict can 
be interpreted in light of recent developments in international legal practice by 
proposing a typology of armed conflicts from the perspective of international 
humanitarian law). 
103 Art. 3 common to GC’s I–IV, supra note 74 [hereinafter Common Article 3 
or CA3]. A non-international armed conflict involves “protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.” Prosecutor v. Tadic ́, Case No. IT–94–1–I, Decision on 
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadić, Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction]. See also Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 8(2)(f) (“[O]ther serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character” applies to “armed conflicts not of an international character 
42
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encompasses conflict between two or more States.104 Although the 
specific LOAC rules that pertain in the two forms of conflict vary to 
an extent, it is generally accepted that the bulk of those governing 
attacks apply in both.  This is a particularly important point in the 
Israeli context because Israel’s position on the nature of the armed 
conflicts in which it has recently been involved is unclear.  For 
instance, no Israeli legal advisor the Authors interviewed was 
willing to definitively state whether the 2014 conflict in Gaza was 
international or non-international in character.105 
Like the United States, Israel is not a party to the 1977 Additional 
Protocol I, the treaty that codifies the core principles of targeting 
law.106  However, most of its provisions reflect customary 
international law that is binding on Israel.  Israel is also party to a 
number of other treaties that govern various aspects of targeting 
practice.  These include, inter alia, the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions;107 the Conventional Weapons Convention Protocols 
on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), Mines, Booby Traps and 
Other Devices (Protocol II, as amended) and Blinding Laser 
Weapons (Protocol IV);108 the Geneva Gas Protocol;109 and the 
                                                     
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.”); 
Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, para. 87, 135170 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (“The Chamber is also conscious of 
Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which, inter alia, 
defines, for its purposes, war crimes committed in an armed conflict not of an 
international character.”); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-A, 
Judgement, para.  49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) 
(listing factors that have bearing on the intensity of hostilities).  
104 Art. 2 common to GC’s I–IV, supra note 74. See also Tadić, Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 103, at para. 70 (“[A]n armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to force by States.”). 
105 See Iain Scobbie, Gaza, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
CONFLICTS 280 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) (discussing the difficulty of 
classifying Israeli operations against Hamas in Gaza). 
106 AP I, supra note 74. 
107 Israel became a party to all four conventions 6 Aug. 1951. GC I, GC II, GC 
III, and GC IV, supra note 74; Id. 
108 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 
(Israel became a party on March 22, 1995); Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other Devices, May 3, 1996, 
2048 U.N.T.S. 93 (Israel became a party on Oct. 30, 2000); Protocol on Blinding Laser 
Weapons, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370 (Israel became a party on Oct. 30, 2000). 
109 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, 
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jun 17, 1995, 26 U.S.T. 
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Hague Cultural Property Convention.110  The International Law 
Department also confirmed that Israel considers the provisions of 
the 1907 Hague Convention IV Annexed Regulations as customary 
law, a position consistent with the findings of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal111 and International Court of 
Justice.112 
The basic contours of the law of targeting are well accepted.113  
Attacks may only be directed at military objectives, combatants, 
members of organized armed groups, and civilians who are directly 
participating in the hostilities,114 and they may not be 
indiscriminate.115  Such attacks must be proportionate in the sense 
that the expected collateral damage is not “excessive” in relation to 
                                                     
571, reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 49 (1975) (Israel became a party 
on Feb. 20, 1969). 
110 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (Israel became a party on Oct. 3, 1957). 
111 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, vol. I, 1947, pp 253-54.    
112 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 257-58 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Case]; see also Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, UN 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), ¶ 35, available at http://www. 
refworld.org/docid/3ae6af0110.html (noting that Hague Convention IV has 
“beyond doubt become part of customary international law.”). 
113 See generally William H. Boothby, The Law of Targeting 139 (2012); Ian 
Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military Objectives, 
Proportionality and Precautions in Attack Under Additional Protocol I 215 (2009); 
Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in The Handbook of the Law of 
Military Operations 245–275 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010); Geoff Corn & 
Gary Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC through an Operational 
Lens, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 337 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt & Eric Widmar, “On Target”: 
Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. Nat’l Security L. & 
Pol’y 379–409 (2014); Michael N. Schmitt & Christopher Markham, Precision Air 
Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 89 Int’l L. Stud. 669 (2013); Geoff Corn & Gary 
Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC through an Operational Lens, 
47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 337 (2012); Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in The 
Handbook of the Law of Military Operations 245–275 (Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck 
eds., 2010).  See also JP 3–60, supra note 61, at app. A (discussing the basic principles 
of the laws of war and legal considerations of targeting). 
114 AP I, supra note 74, at arts. 48 and 51(3); CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 3, 
4, 6, 7.   
115 AP I, supra note 76, at art. 51(4); Department of the Navy & Department of 
Homeland Security, NWP 1–14 M/MCWP 5-12/CMODTPUB P5800.7A, The 
Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (2007), ¶ 5.3.2 
[hereinafter NWP 1–14]; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at ch. 3.     
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the military advantage anticipated to accrue to the attacker.116  Even 
when an attack is directed at a lawful target and the results are likely 
to comply with the rule of proportionality, an attacker must 
undertake feasible measures to minimize harm to civilians.117   
As with most legal regimes, the devil is in the details.  Despite 
universal acceptance of the aforementioned principles, their precise 
interpretation and application has generated occasional 
disagreement and controversy.  The discussion that follows 
highlights these “fault lines” in the law of targeting and, to the 
extent the IDF was willing to express one, catalogues the IDF’s 
position thereon.  As will become apparent, IDF legal positions are 
generally mainstream. 
 
5.1. Additional Protocol I as Customary Law 
 
Although not a Party to the instrument, Israel regards many of 
the provisions of Additional Protocol I, including most of those 
governing targeting, as customary in character.118  Unfortunately, 
and like the United States, it has never issued a definitive article-by-
article summary of its position on the Protocol.  However, the 
International Law Department did offer comment on a number of 
provisions that it deems binding only on the Parties to the treaty.  
Interestingly, in most cases Israel’s position on a particular 
provision tracks that of the United States, at least to the extent that 
the U.S. position is known publically.119  
                                                     
116 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(5)(b); NWP 1–14, supra note 117, at ¶ 5.3.3; 
CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 14.   
117 AP I, supra note74, art. 57(2); NWP 1–14, supra note 115, ¶ 8.3.1; CIHL Study, 
supra note 75, at ch. 5. 
118 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at chs. 1–6 (ICRC sets forth those general 
targeting principles and rules that it deems customary).  See generally Michael N. 
Schmitt, Targeting, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 131–168 (Susan Breau & Elizabeth Wilmshurst 
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
119 Michael J. Matheson (then Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State), 
Remarks in Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary 
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. 
U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419 (1987) (An unofficial, but generally deemed authoritative, 
summary of the U.S. views on Additional Protocol I as customary international law.  
Cites NWP 1–14, supra note 115, as the illustration of the position of a State that is, 
like Israel, not a Party to Additional Protocol I).  
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Israel does not find the two provisions on the protection of the 
natural environment to be customary in character.  The first, Article 
35(3), prohibits the employment of methods or means of warfare 
(tactics and weapons) that are “intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.”  A related provision, Article 55(1), prohibits the use 
of methods or means of warfare that may be expected to cause such 
damage and “thereby prejudice the health or survival of the 
population.”  The distinction between the two provisions is subtle.  
Article 35(3) protects the environment as such, whereas the latter is 
anthropocentric in that it protects humans from negative effects on 
the environment.120  The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study takes the position that the rule is customary in nature, 
although it labels the United States a “persistent objector.”121   
As to Israel, the study states that the country report prepared on 
Israeli practice as part of the project noted that the IDF does “not 
utilize or condone the use of methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the environment.”122  In interviews with senior 
MAG officers, however, it was clear that Israel does not view the 
Additional Protocol I provisions as customary in nature.  Israel’s 
concern is that the prohibitions are absolute; so long as the requisite 
threshold of harm is crossed, an operation is unlawful irrespective 
of its importance.   
Admittedly, that threshold is very high, especially in light of its 
cumulative character.  As a general matter, therefore, the prospect 
of military operations generating such effects is low.  Yet in the 
Middle East, some States rely heavily on oil production and export, 
making them, as illustrated during the “Tanker War” of the 1980s123 
and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, attractive targets.  The region is home 
to a number of fragile ecosystems, especially in the Persian Gulf, that 
are highly vulnerable to environmental harm, such as that which 
inevitably results when oil facilities and transports are attacked.  
Therefore, while the provision may be of only peripheral 
                                                     
120 Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of 
International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 70–71 (1997). 
121 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 44.  
122 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 45. 
123 See generally George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980–1988: Law and Policy, 
74 INT’L L. STUD. 33 (2000). 
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significance to many States, the Authors were of the view that for 
Israel it looms large. 
Israel believes that the environment is indirectly protected by 
the rule of proportionality, which prohibits “an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”124  In this context, Israel takes an anthropocentric view 
regarding damage to the environment; it does not consider the 
natural environment to be an object, as that term is understood in 
the LOAC.125  Rather, damage to the environment is only relevant to 
the extent it jeopardizes the health of civilians (by way of air 
pollution, drinking water pollution, etc.) or damages civilian objects, 
and then it will indeed factor into proportionality assessments.  To 
illustrate, an attack against the environment itself, such as a release 
of oil into the Persian Gulf without military rationale, would not be 
a prohibited attack on a civilian object.  Rather, it would be assessed 
based on any harm it causes to civilians or civilian objects.  The 
Israeli approach would require an attacker to attempt to avoid 
environmental damage that produces collateral effects on civilians 
or civilian objects when conducting an attack by, for instance, 
considering the use of different weapons or tactics or other targets 
that might yield a similar desired effect on the enemy, in order to 
comply with the requirement to take precautions in attack.126 
This position differs from that of the United States127 and the 
Authors, who hold that the environment is an object, and thus harm 
to the environment as such is directly factored into proportionality 
calculations, together with any harm to civilians and civilian objects.  
In other words, in the event of collateral damage to the environment 
or environmental damage that incidentally harms civilians, a strike 
causing widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural 
environment will be lawful if such harm is not excessive to the 
                                                     
124 AP I, supra note 74, at arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); NWP 1–14, supra 
note 115, at ¶ 8.3; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 14.    
125 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.3 (“Civilian objects are all objects which 
are not military objectives as defined in” Additional Protocol I, art. 52.2, AP I, supra 
note 74, at art. 52(1)); CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 9. 
126 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 57(2)(a)(ii); NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.1; 
CIHL Study, supra note 75, at ch. 5 (more fully developing the application of the 
requirement to take precautions in attack).  
127 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.4. 
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military advantage likely to accrue to the attacker.  By the same 
token, even if the harm to the environment resulting from an attack 
falls well below the threshold, the strike will be prohibited if the 
military advantage of the operation is itself low enough to render 
the collateral environmental damage excessive.  
To illustrate these various approaches, consider the Iraqi release 
of oil into the Persian Gulf and the setting ablaze of five–hundred 
Kuwaiti oil wells during the 1990-91 Gulf War.128  Some states 
focused on whether the harm caused by these actions qualified as 
widespread, long-term, and severe.129  For the United States, the 
relevant question was whether the expected harm to the 
environment from the oil and smoke was excessive relative to 
anticipated military advantages, such as leveraging smoke as an 
obscurant against air attack or using oil to foul engines of any boats 
used in an amphibious assault.  For Israel, by contrast, the relevant 
question would have probably been whether the release of oil could 
have been expected to cause excessive harm to the civilian 
population or civilian objects. 
Israel also rejects characterization of the Additional Protocol I’s 
rule on perfidy as fully reflecting customary law. Article 37(1) 
provides that “it is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary 
by resort to perfidy.”  It defines perfidy as acts that invite “the 
confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled 
to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international 
law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that 
confidence.”130  The classic example is an individual who dresses as 
a civilian in order to get close enough to the adversary to attack 
without raising suspicion.  The prohibition applies only if the act is 
motivated by a desire to exploit feigned protective status in order to 
wound, kill or capture; merely wearing civilian clothes does not 
implicate the prohibition, even when conducting attacks. 
The ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law study 
claims that the prohibition is customary in nature.131  There is 
universal consensus that the customary law prohibition includes 
                                                     
128 U.S. Department of Defense Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf 
War – Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 31 ILM 612, 636–37 (1992) [hereinafter 
Gulf War Report]. 
129 The debate was merely illustrative of the threshold issue because Iraq did 
not become a party to Additional Protocol I until 2010.  
130 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 37(1). 
131 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 65. 
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feigning protected status in order to wound or kill the enemy, that 
is, to conduct “attacks,” a term of art in the LOAC.132  However, 
Israel does not recognize feigning protected status in order to capture 
as perfidy.133  Its position is supported by the fact that treacherous 
killing or wounding was proscribed in Article 23 of the Hague 
Regulations, a treaty that, as noted above, is considered to set forth 
norms that are today customary.134  Only in Additional Protocol I 
was the prohibition extended to acts intended to capture the enemy.  
Indeed, the Rome Statute, which was adopted nearly a quarter 
century after Additional Protocol I, omits capture in its rendering of 
the war crime.135  Recent manuals prepared by international groups 
of experts as restatements of the LOAC likewise omit any reference 
to capture in their rules.136 
In light of the fact that Israel’s enemies have a strategic objective 
of capturing individual members of the IDF, it is somewhat curious 
that Israel maintains fidelity to a formalistic analysis of the law of 
perfidy, unless it wishes to employ the tactic itself to capture 
members of the enemy forces.  The United State’s most recent 
military manual, the 2007 Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, states that “[i]t is a violation of the law of armed conflict 
to kill, injure, or capture the enemy by false indication of intent to 
surrender or by feigning shipwreck, sickness, wounds, or civilian 
status.”137  However, the annotated version of an earlier manual 
                                                     
132 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 49 (defining “attacks” as “acts of violence against 
the adversary, whether in offence or in defence”). See Sean Watts, Law-of-War 
Perfidy, 219 MIL. L. REV. 106 (2014) (discussing perfidy generally). 
133 See Ido Rosenzweig, Combatants Dressed as Civilians?: The Case of Israeli 
Mista’arvim under International Law, THE ISRAEL DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE POLICY PAPER 
8E, 45–49 (2014) (discussing capture as perfidy in the Israeli context). 
134 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to 
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations] (making it “especially 
forbidden . . . to kill or wound [treacherous] individuals belonging to the hostile 
nation or army.” Capture is not addressed.). 
135 Rome Statute, supra note 81, at art. 8(2)b)(xi).  See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, 
CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: WITH COMMENTARY, ¶ 2.3.6 (International 
Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2006) (omitting capture in its rule on perfidy). 
136 AMW Manual, supra note 63, at r. 111(a); Prepared by the International 
Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare r. 60 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter Tallinn Manual]. 
137 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 12.7. 
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containing the same provision cites to Hague Regulations Article 
23(b) and Additional Protocol I Article 37(1) as authority.138  In light 
of the fact that Article 23(b) makes no mention of capture, the U.S. 
reference to capture appears questionable as a strict matter of 
customary law.  Even still, it would seem to be a sensible approach 
that will lend itself to the process of crystallization as a customary 
norm. 
Israel has a number of undercover units (Mista’arvim) that are 
active in the West Bank and Gaza.  These include the IDF’s Duvdevan 
and the Israeli Border Police’s Yamas.139  So long as the members 
thereof are not wearing civilian attire for the express purpose of 
conducting attacks, their operations are not perfidious.  At least by 
the Israeli position, with which the Authors agree as a matter of law, 
it may do so in order to capture individuals whose capture is 
permissible under LOAC. 
Like the United States,140 Israel opposes a number of other 
articles that do not directly affect its targeting operations, 
particularly Articles 1(4) and 44(3).  The effect of the former is to 
extend the reach of Additional Protocol I, and by reference 
international armed conflict, to situations in which “peoples are 
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination . . . .” It is unclear whether Israel objects on the same 
basis as the United States, that including conflicts with national 
liberation movements, a term lacking precision, within the ambit of 
international armed conflict “would undermine the principle that 
the rights and duties of international law attach primarily to entities 
that have those elements of sovereignty that allow them to be held 
accountable for their actions and the resources to fulfill their 
obligations.”141  This is so because in the Targeted Killing case the 
Israeli Supreme Court applied the law governing international 
                                                     
138 Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations, 73 INT’L L. STUD. 514 (1999), n.23 [hereinafter ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT to 
NWP 1–14].  But c.f. Matheson, supra note 119, at 425 (including “capture” in his 
unofficial explanation of those provisions of AP I that the U.S. deems customary). 
139 See ROSENZWEIG, supra note 133, at 23–24 (summarizing the creation of 
special undercover units as a response to failures to suppress guerilla-styled attacks 
against civilians).   
140 Matheson, supra note 119, at 425. 
141 Abraham D. Sofaer, The Position of the United States on Current Law of War 
Agreements, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 460, 463 (1987) [hereinafter Sofaer]. 
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armed conflict to situations involving non-State actors in which the 
conflict “crosses the borders of the state,” as is the case of the West 
Bank and Gaza.142  Further, MAG officers confirmed that uncertainty 
exists as to whether the recent conflict in Gaza was of an 
international or non-international character.  However, whatever 
the basis of the Israeli objection, Israel definitely objects to 
application of the Article 1(4) approach.  Although not directly 
bearing on the issue of Israeli targeting, note that the Israeli position 
deprives members of national liberation movements of any 
belligerent immunity for their attacks on Israeli targets, including 
those that qualify as military objectives. 
Article 44(3) allows combatants to retain combatant status, and 
therefore belligerent immunity, even when wearing civilian clothes 
during an attack so long as they carry their weapons openly when 
deploying to, from, and during an engagement.  The United States 
has objected that the provision’s application will result in “increased 
risk to the civilian population within which such irregulars often 
attempt to hide.”143  In light of the extent to which Israel’s enemies 
have adopted this tactic to frustrate IDF targeting, Article 44(3) is 
equally objectionable to Israel.  
Interestingly, the IDF lawyers would not express an opinion on 
the customary nature of Additional Protocol I prohibitions on 
reprisals, that is, unlawful actions (including attacks) taken to 
compel the other side to desist in its own unlawful acts.  There is 
general acceptance that the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I prohibitions on reprisals (or other unlawful 
actions) against prisoners of war, interned civilians, civilians in 
occupied territory or otherwise in the hands of an adverse party to 
the conflict (and their property), those who are hors de combat, and 
medical personnel, facilities, vehicles, and equipment are customary 
in character.144  But the Additional Protocol I, Article 51(6) and 52(1), 
prohibitions on reprisals against civilians and civilian objects 
respectively are not universally seen as customary in nature.  Even 
some States that are Party to the instrument have set forth 
understandings restricting its application,145 and when preparing 
                                                     
142 Targeted Killings Case, supra note 96, at ¶ 18. 
143 Sofaer, supra note 141, at 463. 
144 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 136, at r. 46, cmt. 4 (demonstrating 
the views of the International Group of Experts that prepared the manual). 
145 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF DEF., JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT,  ¶ 16.19.1 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL] (outlining the 
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the Customary International Humanitarian Law study, the ICRC 
refrained from asserting that the Articles had achieved customary 
status.146  It would be surprising, therefore, if Israel adopted the 
position that the two provisions have crystallized into customary 
law.  Instead, the Authors speculate that the IDF reticence to offer a 
view on the matter reflects the extreme sensitivity of the issue 
generally and Israel’s unique susceptibility to lawfare specifically. 
 
5.2. Military Objectives 
 
Like most militaries, the IDF accepts as reflective of customary 
law the Additional Protocol I, Article 52(2), definition of military 
objectives: 
In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are 
limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military 
action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or 
neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers 
a definite military advantage.147 
Military objectives may be directly attacked, and any damage to 
them that collaterally occurs during an attack on another military 
objective has no bearing on the proportionality and precautions in 
attack analyses.148  
In the Israeli context, the “purpose” and “use” criteria are 
especially important.  A civilian object becomes a military objective 
whenever used for military ends, however slight the use (beyond a 
de minimis level).149  For instance, when Hamas uses a civilian 
                                                     
United Kingdom’s opposition to certain obligations with respect to Articles 51–55 
of the Additional Protocol).  
146 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 145-48; Id. at r. 146, cmt.   
147 Id., at r. 8.  See also NWP 1–14, supra note 117, at ¶ 8.2, (delineating what can 
and cannot be attacked as military objectives). 
148 See generally AGNIESZKA JAHEC-NEALE, THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TARGETING PRACTICE (2015) (Routledge Research in the 
Law of Armed Conflict) (exploring generally the objectives associated with war). 
149 As an example of de minimis usage, one senior Israeli legal adviser spoke of 
a Hamas military leader who makes a single phone call from a building.  The 
building does not become a military objective, although, of course, the individual 
is targetable. 
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residence as a command center, a school as a weapons storage 
facility, or the roof of a hospital as a location from which to launch 
rockets, these buildings become military objectives subject to attack 
by operation of the use criterion —without prejudice, of course, to 
the various LOAC requirements such as providing a warning to 
desist before an attack on a misused hospital may proceed.150   
Application of this well-settled law in the Israeli context is 
sometimes difficult for outside observers to grasp.  Consider tunnel 
construction as an example.  IDF intelligence has identified a specific 
configuration of concrete supports that are manufactured in Gaza, 
the sole purpose of which is to support Hamas military tunnels.  If 
accurate, the factory producing them is unquestionably a military 
objective, although a strike on the factory may be perceived as an 
unlawful attack on a civilian object.151  The law may be 
unambiguous in its acceptance of this practice, but perceptions 
matter in a lawfare-intense environment. 
Another issue that often surfaces in reviews of Israeli targeting 
practices is attacking non-military government buildings.152  MAG 
officers interviewed stated that the IDF does not target such 
buildings based on the fact that they are used for government 
activities.  Instead, the officers asserted that government buildings 
are, like any other buildings, only attacked when used for military 
activities or when members of the enemy force are inside.  In the 
latter case, the individuals are the targets, not the building itself.  
Damage to the building is factored into the proportionality analysis 
described below as collateral damage if it is merely a location at 
which the enemy is coincidentally present.  
                                                     
150 GC I, supra note 74, at art. 21. 
151 Compare Tova Dvorin, IAF Gaza Strike Targeted Hamas Terror Tunnel 
Construction, ARUTZ SHEVA (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/ 
News/News.aspx/188883 (containing Defense Minister Ya’alon’s defense of a 
recent IDF strike on these grounds), with “I Lost Everything:” Israel’s Unlawful 
Destruction of Property During Operation Cast Lead, HUM. RTS. WATCH  (May 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0510webwcover_1.pdf 
(noting that Israel damaged many of Gaza’s ready mix concrete factories despite 
the fact that the Human Rights Watch says “[t]here is no evidence that any of the 
cement and concrete factories in Gaza contributed to the military efforts of 
Palestinian armed groups during the fighting”).   
152 See B’Tselem to Attorney General Mazuz: Concern Over Israel Targeting Civilian 
Objects in the Gaza Strip, B’TSELEM (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.btselem.org/ 
gaza_strip/20081231_gaza_letter_to_mazuz (complaining to the Attorney General 
about IDF targeting practices of which B’Tselem is a frequent critic). 
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In the view of the Authors, this analytical framework would 
logically include police facilities.  If the enemy’s police forces are 
operating as a unit against the IDF, the unit may be treated as an 
organized armed group (see below) and its facilities therefore 
qualify as military objectives.  However, if members of the police are 
involved in hostilities merely on an individual basis, a police station 
only becomes a military objective while used for military purposes. 
Controversy has surrounded attacks on media facilities for well 
over a decade.  This issue surfaced most prominently during 
Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO air campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Among the airstrikes was one 
against a Serbian radio and television station in Belgrade that 
resulted in civilian casualties.  The Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia investigated the 
incident and decided not to pursue prosecution,153 although it did 
form the basis for the well-known Bankovic litigation before the 
European Court of Human Rights.154 
When queried on media facilities as a target, the International 
Law Department stated it supported the approach taken in the well-
known Final Report to the Prosecutor on the NATO bombing 
campaign.  The report states:   
[T]he attack appears to have been justified by NATO as part 
of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the FRY 
[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Command, Control and 
Communications network, the nerve centre and apparatus 
that keeps Milosević in power, and also as an attempt to 
dismantle the FRY propaganda machinery. Insofar as the 
attack actually was aimed at disrupting the communications 
network, it was legally acceptable. 
If, however, the attack was made because . . . the station was 
part of the propaganda machinery, the legal basis was more 
debatable.  Disrupting government propaganda may help to 
undermine the morale of the population and the armed 
forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian facility on such 
grounds alone may not meet the "effective contribution to 
                                                     
153 INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ¶91 (2000), available at 
http://www.icty.org/sid/10052#IVB3 [hereinafter Final Report to the Prosecutor]. 
154 Bankovic v. Belgium, 123 Eur. Ct. H.R 335, 371 (2001). 
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military action" and "definite military advantage" criteria 
required [in the definition of military objectives]. . . .  It 
appears, however, that NATO’s targeting of the RTS 
building for propaganda purposes was an incidental (albeit 
complementary) aim of its primary goal of disabling the 
Serbian military command and control system and to 
destroy the nerve system and apparatus that keeps Milosević 
in power . . . .  
Assuming the station was a legitimate objective, the civilian 
casualties were unfortunately high but do not appear to be 
clearly disproportionate.155 
Based on this report, it may be concluded that, for the IDF, a 
media facility becomes a target only when used for military 
purposes.  Such purposes do not include propaganda or inciting 
anti-Israeli fervor.  It does not even include enhancing enemy 
morale since, according to the report, such a contribution to military 
action is too remote to qualify a broadcast station as a military 
objective.  Israel’s approach to this matter is quite conventional. 
A number of situations the IDF faces are less settled.  Of 
particular note is the long-standing debate in the LOAC community 
over so-called “war-sustaining” military objectives.  There is 
universal agreement that objects that are “war-fighting,” such as 
rockets, and those that are “war-supporting,” like a facility in which 
home-made rockets are produced, qualify as military objectives.  
However, the United States has taken the position that objects that 
provide the financial basis for conducting an armed conflict also 
qualify.156  The classic contemporary example is the oil export 
industry of a country that relies on export profits to fund its war 
effort.157  Based on this war-sustaining approach, oil production, 
refining, storage, and shipment facilities upon which the export 
industry relies qualify as military objectives. 
Israel’s recent enemies engage in few production activities that 
would qualify objects as military objectives on this basis.  However, 
an unusual issue has surfaced in the context of financing.  Because 
of the economic situation, the lack of access to banking and funds 
                                                     
155 Final Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 153, at ¶¶ 75–77. 
156 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶¶ 8.2., 8.2.5.  
157 ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO NWP 1–14, supra note 138, at 403 n.11 (using 
cotton export during the American Civil War as an example). 
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transferring capabilities, and the nature of the transactions involved, 
much of the economic activity supporting the military operations of 
organized armed groups fighting Israel occurs on a cash basis.  Cash 
is used to buy weaponry, pay fighters, and the like.  In a sense, the 
cash “sustains” the war effort.  This reality raises the question of 
whether the IDF may target the money when Israeli intelligence 
agencies physically locate it? 
By the war-sustaining approach, it would seem arguable that the 
cash is a targetable military objective so long as a clear nexus can be 
established between it and the military wing of Hamas, Hezbollah, 
or other organized armed groups.  It does not matter whether it is 
designated for any particular purpose, so long as there is a reliable 
indication that it is destined to support an armed group.  This is the 
view of one of the Authors. 
Those who reject the war-sustaining approach, including the 
other Author, would require that there be clear evidence that the 
cash is going to be used to support military operations per se, as in 
purchasing weapons or explosives.  In such cases only, the money 
would qualify on the basis of being “war-supporting.”  It would not 
suffice that the funds are going to be used to sustain the enemy’s 
overall war effort in the general sense.   
The MAG officers with whom this was discussed did not 
indicate whether the IDF had taken a firm position one way or the 
other on the issue.  However, it and both of the Authors agreed that 
once the cash is physically transferred to an armed group, it qualifies 
as a military objective by nature.  Similar to the way that the money 
held by the military finance section of a regular armed force qualifies 
as a military objective by nature, it is used solely for the purposes of 
the armed force and without which it would be difficult for the force 
to operate. 
There are a number of ongoing debates regarding application of 
the concept of military objectives regarding which the IDF would 
not offer a view.  For instance, consider the case of two buildings in 
close proximity.  Actionable intelligence exists that one of them is 
being used for military purposes that necessitate a strike, but it is 
unclear which is being so used.  It would appear that there are two 
options.  The first is to strike both knowing that one is a military 
objective; by this approach, damage to the other and any occupants 
thereof must factor into the proportionality and precautions in 
attack analyses.  Because it is unknown which of them is the military 
objective, the one that will suffer the least collateral damage must be 
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treated as if it is the military objective for proportionality rule 
purposes.  The second view is that absent definitive information that 
verifies the use of one of them in particular, both must be presumed 
to be civilian and therefore the attack may not proceed because an 
attack is being directed at at least one civilian object.  Although the 
MAG officers consulted were unwilling to take a position on this 
very realistic scenario, they did indicate that the sensitivity of such 
a situation would generally lead—for policy, if not legal, reasons—
to a decision to refrain from attack. 
They were also unwilling to articulate the IDF’s position with 
respect to major lines of communication.  The debate concerns 
whether main roads, railways, and similarly important avenues of 
transportation qualify as military objectives by “nature” or by 
“purpose or use.”  If the former analysis is made, the lines of 
communication may be struck at any time irrespective of whether 
they are being, or going to be, used for military transportation.  
Conversely, if lines of communication qualify as objectives only by 
purpose or use, then they may only be struck when so used or when 
the intention to use them manifests.  The Authors take the latter 
view, but were unable to pin the MAG officers down on this point.  
It is a particularly important issue in southern Lebanon, where lines 
of communication are critical to Hezbollah’s ability to maneuver 
and be resupplied during hostilities.  
With respect to Gaza operations, the most important lines of 
communication are tunnels.  The legal analysis of tunnels as military 
objectives is somewhat sharper.  As tunnels running from Gaza into 
Israel have only military functions, the IDF treats them as military 
objectives by nature.  They are used solely for the transit of fighters 
and weapons into Israel and for the exfiltration of captured IDF 
personnel and Israeli civilians, thus enabling the tunnels to be 
targeted at any time.  
By contrast, the tunnels to and from Egypt are sometimes used 
exclusively for civilian activities like smuggling, sometimes only for 
military undertakings, and sometimes for both purposes.  Unless 
used in an exclusively military manner, they must be treated as 
civilian objects that become military objectives only when used for 
military ends, most notably smuggling rockets into Gaza.  Dual use 
tunnels that serve both purposes on a regular basis are, like any 
other dual-use object, military objectives.  Additionally, tunnels not 
currently being used for military ends may become targetable if 
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reliable intelligence surfaces that they are likely to be so used in the 
future. 
 
5.3. Persons on the Battlefield 
 
Israel takes the traditional binary approach to qualifying 
persons on the battlefield.  They are either members of the armed 
forces or civilians.  This dichotomy is, however, subject to 
controversial nuances regarding civilians who in some fashion take 
part in the hostilities.  Members of the armed forces may be targeted 
at any time; in other words, their susceptibility to attack derives 
solely from their status, which provides the basis for so-called 
“status-based targeting.”  Civilians are not subject to attacks based 
on status.  Instead, pursuant to Additional Protocol I, Article 51(3), 
civilians who “take a direct part in hostilities” lose their civilian 
protections during an international armed conflict only “for such 
time” as they so participate.  An analogous rule applies during a 
non-international armed conflict.158  Thus, their targetability 
depends on their engagement in acts that qualify as “direct 
participation” and expires once they desist in the participation.  In 
addition to losing protection from direct attack while they 
participate, they are not to be treated as civilians with respect to rule 
of proportionality calculations or the requirement to take 
precautions in attack.  These general rules are well accepted as 
reflecting customary law.159 
The topic of direct participation was considered by a group of 
international experts between 2003 and 2008 convened at the 
invitation of the International Committee of the Red Cross.160  When 
the group could not reach a consensus, the ICRC released its own 
report on the subject as The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law.161  
                                                     
158 AP II, supra note 74, at art. 13.3.  
159 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 10.  See also, e.g., NWP 1–14, supra note 115, 
at ¶ 8.2.2 (indicating the U.S.’s position that civilians serving in certain roles are 
subject to hostile attack as unlawful combatants). 
160 One of the Authors participated as an expert. 
161 Compare Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notions of Direct Participation Under International Humanitarian Law 41–
68 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance] (describing the ICRC’s position 
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A major sticking point in the deliberations was the meaning of 
the phrase “for such time.”  Applying a restrictive interpretation, 
Article 51(3)’s plain text seemed to imply that members of an armed 
group fighting a State may be attacked only while they are engaged 
in combat or performing a combat related activity.  This is in contrast 
to the general rule that all members of a State’s armed forces are 
targetable around the clock regardless of their duties.  The 
interpretation of 51(3) advanced by the ICRC in their 2008 
Interpretive Guidance, which the United States and other States 
reject, clearly favored non-State groups, an incongruous result in 
light of the LOAC’s foundational balancing of humanitarian 
considerations and military necessity.162   
As the ICRC project was underway, the Supreme Court of Israel 
issued its 2006 opinion on the matter in the Targeted Killing case.163  
The Court held that Article 51(3) reflected customary law in its 
entirety.164  It also held that a civilian who participates in the 
hostilities “does not lose that status,” only the protections associated 
                                                     
on existing international humanitarian law), and Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance 
Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
Int’l L. & Pol. 831, 914 (2010) (arguing that that Interpretive Guidance is actually the 
best balance of all considerations in war), with W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally 
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 769, 829–30 (2010) (claiming that Part IX of the 
Interpretive Guidance is legally incorrect and inappropriate); Michael N. Schmitt, 
Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. 
J. Int’l L. & Pol.  697, 738 (2010) (claiming that the Interpretive Guidance does not 
have the best argument about civilian or temporal participation in hostilities); 
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 Harv. Nat’l Security J. 5, 6–7 (2010) (arguing that the 
internal divisions in writing the Interpretive Guidance led to a completely flawed 
ultimate document); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and 
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. 
& Pol. 641, 693–95 (2010) (opining that the ICRC Interpretive Guidance has failed 
in its goal of protecting civilians in war and applying international humanitarian 
law). 
162 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in 
International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795 
(2010) (exploring the balance between military expediency and humanitarian 
principles in war and how effective current International Humanitarian Law is at 
balancing the two). 
163 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Gov’t 2006 v. 2 Isr. L. Rep. 459 
(2006).  
164 Id. at 501. See also Aerial Strikes against Terrorists: Some Legal Aspects, ISR. DEF. 
FORCE MIL. ADVOC. GENERAL CORPS, available at: http://www.law.idf.il/592-6584-
en/Patzar.aspx (reviewing rules of aerial strikes undertaken by the IDF). 
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with it while so participating.165  But with regard to the “for such 
time” issue, the Court held that:  
[A] civilian who joins a terrorist organization that becomes 
his home, and within the framework of his position in that 
organization he carries out a series of hostilities, with short 
interruptions between them for resting, loses his immunity 
against being attacked “for such time" as he is carrying out a 
series of operations.  Indeed, for such a civilian the rest 
between hostilities is nothing more than preparation for the 
next hostile act.166  
In other words, members of groups like those fighting Israel 
were to be treated as direct participants while they were engaged in 
a series of acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities, even 
when not engaging in such acts at the moment of attack. 
The Interpretive Guidance took a different approach to resolving 
the impasse.  Borrowing a concept from elsewhere in the LOAC, it 
characterized members of “organized armed group[s]” as “armed 
forces,” not civilians, for targeting purposes.167  By this 
interpretation, the “for such time” caveat does not apply to members 
of organized armed groups, and they are thus subject to status-
based targeting.  However, the ICRC went on to limit this 
characterization to members of the group who have a “continuous 
combat function,” that is, duties that affect the enemy’s combat 
capabilities or one’s own.168  This restriction has proven highly 
controversial.169 
The IDF remains fully committed to the Israeli Supreme Court's 
judgment in the Targeted Killings case, and it applies the guidelines 
laid down by the Court whenever targeting civilians taking a direct 
part in hostilities.  At the same time, the ongoing armed conflict in 
which Israel is engaged has increasingly illustrated the extent to 
which the groups it faces have become highly organized and combat 
effective.  Furthermore, the notion of organized armed groups as 
                                                     
165 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture 2006 v. 2 Isr. L. Rep. at 494–95. 
166 Id. at 501–02. 
167 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 161, at 31–32. 
168 Id. at 33–36. 
169 See, e.g., Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 767–77 (2010) (criticizing 
the ICRC Interpretive Guidance as being far too restrictive with respect to the 
timing of acts of war). 
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armed forces for targeting purposes, which had its genesis in the 
ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance (published after the Targeted Killings 
judgment was rendered), is now generally accepted as reflecting 
customary international law.  Accordingly, the IDF believes it is 
more accurate to characterize certain groups, such as Hamas' 
military wing (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades), as armed forces 
rather than as assemblages of civilians directly participating in the 
conflict.  The IDF thus accepts the notion of “organized armed 
groups” and relies on it in its targeting operations.  This position has 
yet to be tested in the Supreme Court but, as with other sensitive 
matters of legal policy, has been vetted through the inter-agency 
process and approved by senior officials in the Ministry of Justice. 
Although now embracing the ICRC’s organized armed group 
approach, the IDF has not followed suit with respect to the concept 
of continuous combat function (“CCF”).  MAG officers noted that 
the CCF criterion creates a legal imbalance.  For instance, it would 
countenance the targeting of a MAG officer uninvolved in targeting 
matters but not a lawyer serving in an identical role on the other 
side.  The same would be true of IDF public affairs officers, finance 
officers, or others removed from direct involvement in the 
hostilities.  The IDF therefore rejects the concept on the basis that it 
is neither an aspect of treaty law that binds Israel nor does sufficient 
State practice or opinio juris exist to support the concept’s 
characterization as customary law.  In the view of the Authors, the 
IDF is on very firm ground in rejecting the CCF concept. 
Despite that rejection, the IDF does accept the premise that 
groups may consist of both military and non-military wings.  All 
members of military wings, such as Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades, are targetable at all times in the Israeli view.  Yet, so long 
as the wings are clearly distinct and the non-military wing engages 
in no activities that contribute to the hostilities in any meaningful 
way, the IDF treats the non-military wing members as civilians who 
may only be targeted if and when they directly participate in the 
hostilities.  The IDF considers the leader of groups comprising both 
military and nonmilitary wings to be a lawful target when that 
individual’s duties include command and control of the military 
wing’s activities; the fact that the individual also leads the civilian 
activities of the group does not affect this determination.  
As important as the issue of when an individual may be targeted 
is that of whether the conduct he or she is engaging in qualifies as 
direct participation in the hostilities.  The MAG has issued a list of 
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activities that meet this definition.  The list is classified, but MAG 
officers interviewed acknowledged that preparing rockets for 
launch, launching rockets, and retreating from the location of a 
rocket launch all qualify.170  MAG officers likewise indicated that 
religious leaders who harangue Israel and its policies are not 
considered direct participants.  Neither are those individuals who 
generally incite violence, recruit for enemy organizations, or 
provide broad financing for enemy operations.  Like the Authors, 
however, they opined that recruiting for a particular operation, as in 
recruiting a suicide bomber to attack a particular target, is direct 
participation, as is providing the supplies or financing for that 
specific operation.  As a general matter, the IDF’s position is that the 
greater the nexus between the act and a particular military 
operation, the more appropriate it is to characterize the activity in 
question as direct participation. 
It would, of course, be impossible for the list to contain all 
possible forms of direct participation.  Therefore, if the commander 
of an Attack Cell believes an individual is directly participating but 
the activity concerned does not appear on the list, the commander 
may elevate the matter to higher authorities for authorization to 
strike.  Those authorities will enjoy legal advice when making their 
determination.   
It is clear that the IDF, like the U.S. armed forces, takes a broader 
view of acts that qualify as direct participation than set forth in the 
Interpretive Guidance.  As an example, the Guidance labels the 
production and transport of weapons and equipment as indirect 
participation “unless carried out as an integral part of a specific 
military operation designed to directly” harm the enemy.171  By this 
standard, civilians who are assembling, storing, and transporting 
rockets meant to attack Israel retain their protection from attack.  
Further, if the rockets they are associated with are attacked as 
military objectives, any harm to those individuals is a factor in the 
proportionality and precautions in attack analysis that attends the 
                                                     
170 In the Targeted Killing case, the Supreme Court described direct 
participation as including armed civilians on their way to use those arms against 
the enemy, those armed civilians returning from such engagements, individuals 
who collect intelligence for military purposes, persons who transport unlawful 
combatants to or from the hostilities, weapons operators, and those who supervise 
the use or service of weapons.  HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture 2006 v. 2 Isr. 
L. Rep. at 496–50. 
171 ICRC Interpretive guidance, supra note 161, at 53. 
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strike.  This position is styled by proponents as analogous to the 
generally accepted view that workers in a munitions factory are 
civilians who continue to enjoy their protected status despite an 
activity that plainly contributes to the conflict.  Along the same lines, 
if members of an organized armed group carry them out, the 
activities do not amount to a continuous combat function that would 
permit targeting the individuals based solely on membership in the 
group. 
Israel and the Authors view such activity as direct participation 
in hostilities.  This is both a principled position and a practical one 
in light of the fact that rockets pose a threat to Israel’s civilian 
population, are built in or near the battle area, and are the weapon 
with the greatest potential for bringing those who use it success in 
the conflict (however success might be defined).  To conclude 
otherwise would ignore the military necessity element underlying 
the LOAC and, quite simply, be illogical in light of the reality of the 
conflicts Israel faces.  Interestingly, the MAG officers asked would 
not offer an opinion on whether individuals transporting weapons 
through the tunnels into Gaza are directly participating in 
hostilities.  Both of the Authors would readily conclude they are so 
participating on the basis of the proximity to the area of combat and 
the immediacy of the use of the weapons.  
 
5.4. Human Shields  
 
The IDF regularly confronts the use of human shields by its 
enemies.172 According to Additional Protocol I, Article 57(7), 
[T]he presence or movements of the civilian population or 
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points 
or areas immune from military operations, in particular in 
attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield, favour or impede military operations.  The Parties to 
the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian 
                                                     
172 See, e.g., Captured Hamas Combat Manual Explains Benefits of Human Shields, 
THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.          
idfblog.com/blog/2014/08/04/captured-hamas-combat-manual-explains-         
benefits-human-shields/ (citing a Hamas instructional manual on the benefits of 
shielding); Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields and International Humanitarian Law, 
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009) (discussing human shields generally). 
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population or individual civilians in order to attempt to 
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military 
operations.  
Violation of the prohibition by the enemy, however, does not 
relieve an attacker of the requirement to take the presence of 
civilians into consideration when performing proportionality and 
precautions analyses.173   
Although most States, including the United States and Israel,174 
accept these provisions as reflecting customary law, the 
interpretation thereof has been the source of significant controversy 
since it was highlighted during the Interpretive Guidance project.175  
The project’s debate surrounded the distinction between individuals 
who voluntarily shield a target, as when individuals go to a target 
in order to shield it from attack, and those who shield involuntarily, 
as in the case of weapons placed in a school occupied by students 
and teachers unaware of the presence of the weapons.  Israel has 
faced both situations.  For instance, the IDF often warns individuals 
in a building to be attacked to leave the facility.  In some cases, 
Hamas responds by urging people to come to the target area in order 
to deter the Israeli attack.  More commonly used is the practice of 
conducting military activities, such as launching rockets, from the 
top of, or next to, inhabited buildings, like apartment complexes and 
schools.176 
Although the dispute over the treatment of human shields is 
complex,177 a review of its broad outlines will suffice here.  With 
                                                     
173 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(8). 
174 See NWP 1-14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.3.2 (“A party to an armed conflict has 
an affirmative duty to remove civilians under its control . . . from the vicinity of 
objects of likely enemy attack.”) 
175 ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 161. 
176 Human Rights Watch, a frequent critic of Israeli military operations, 
nonetheless has also pointedly complained about Hamas’ use of densely populated 
urban terrain to mask its rocket attacks.  Gaza: Palestinian Rockets Unlawfully Targeted 
Israeli Civilians, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/12/24/gaza-palestinian-rockets-unlawfully-targeted-israeli-civilians 
(“Human Rights Watch research in Gaza found that armed groups repeatedly fired 
rockets from densely populated areas, near homes, businesses, and a hotel, 
unnecessarily placing civilians in the vicinity at grave risk from Israeli counter-
fire.”). 
177 ICRC Interpretive guidance, supra note 161, at 56–57; see also generally 
Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields and International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009). 
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respect to involuntary shields, Israel adopts the majority view that 
involuntary shields retain all civilian protection.  An attacker may 
not directly attack them, it must consider their presence when 
making proportionality calculations, and it has to take feasible 
precautions to avoid harming them.  If it is unclear whether the 
person shielding is acting voluntarily or involuntarily, Israel will 
presume that the shielding is involuntary.  An alternative view that 
they lose protection because the enemy should not be entitled to 
benefit from its unlawful behavior has nearly faded away.  A slight 
variant of the latter approach that is also on the wane is that 
although the involuntary shields do not lose all protection, the harm 
to them is somehow “discounted” when making the proportionality 
calculation.178  
A persistent debate still surrounds the use of voluntary shields.  
There are two diametrically opposed positions.  The ICRC is of the 
view, embraced by some LOAC experts, that civilians only lose their 
protections for such time as they are physically blocking or 
otherwise physically shielding a military objective, as in blocking a 
bridge over which troops need to pass or shielding enemy forces 
that are attacking by moving forward in front of them.179  In such 
cases, their shielding amounts to direct participation in hostilities.  
However, in all other cases of voluntary shielding, the civilian 
retains the full protection of civilian status. 
This is not the opinion of Israel or, for that matter, the United 
States or the Authors.180  Israel, in a position set forth by the Supreme 
Court in the Targeted Killing case,181 believes that characterizing 
voluntary shielding as direct participation in hostilities better 
reflects the balancing of humanitarian considerations and military 
necessity that permeates the LOAC.  The logic underlying this 
stance is difficult to counter.  After all, by the competing approach, 
an enemy population could effectively shield military objectives as 
a matter of law simply by gathering enough civilians on or near the 
                                                     
178 For instance, this is the view held by Yoram Dinstein.  YORAM DINSTEIN, THE 
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 155 
(2d ed., 2010).   
179 ICRC Interpretive guidance, supra note 161, at 56–57.  
180 The U.S. view acknowledges that the law is unsettled, but that voluntary 
human shields “may also be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities or 
contributing to the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining capability, and may be 
excluded from the proportionality analysis.”  NWP 1-14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.3.2. 
181 HCJ 769/02, supra note 96, at ¶ 36.  
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target to render the likely collateral damage excessive relative to the 
military importance of the target.  Indeed, in an asymmetrical 
conflict in which one Party can, like Israel, conduct air or artillery 
attacks with relative impunity, the tactic may be significantly more 
effective than the use of defensive weapon systems.  This is certainly 
the case with respect to operations in Gaza and, to a lesser extent, 
southern Lebanon.   
Of course, the same dynamic attends the use of involuntary 
shields, but a different balancing of humanitarian considerations 
and military necessity is at play.  In the case of involuntary shields, 
a Party to the conflict is placing the civilians at risk in order to 
enhance its military position.  That Party should not be permitted to 
deprive civilians of the protections to which they are entitled under 
the LOAC.  By contrast, during voluntary shielding, the individuals 
concerned are taking the actions that may result in loss of their 
civilian protections.  The LOAC already acknowledges the 
possibility of such loss in the case of voluntary physical acts of direct 
participation in hostilities such as gathering tactical intelligence or 
conducting attacks.  To allow voluntary human shields to affect 
military operations by exploiting the law would be to admit of a 
distinction without a meaningful difference in terms of either 
humanitarian considerations or military necessity. 
The preceding analysis of shielding is purely legal.  Although 
the IDF would not disclose its actual operational approach to 
situations involving shielding because doing so would enable its 
enemies to more effectively employ the tactic, it is fair to say that the 
IDF approach is much more restrictive than allowed by the law.  In 
particular, MAG officers did not refer to any situation in which 
physical shielding is not involved that would merit direct targeting 
of the shields themselves (as distinct from the entity they are 
shielding). 
An issue that has recently surfaced involves the refusal of 
civilians to leave the target area following warnings of attack.  For 
instance, during Operation Protective Edge Israel warned Gaza’s 
population of pending attacks and not only directed it to evacuate 
to areas where no attacks would occur, but also identified routes to 
get there that would be safe from on-going military operations.  
While many civilians heeded the warnings, some did not.  Indeed, 
Hamas actively encouraged the civilian population not to evacuate.  
On a smaller scale, warnings of individual attacks were also 
sometimes disregarded.   
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It has been suggested that civilians who do not heed warnings 
should either be treated as voluntary human shields directly 
participating in hostilities or, the fact that they choose to remain in 
the target area should somehow be factored into the proportionality 
calculations and precautions in attack requirements.182  The IDF 
rejects these arguments.  Civilians have no LOAC obligation to leave 
the target area and thus do not forfeit any of their legal protection 
when remaining there.  As a practical matter, they place themselves 
at risk of becoming injured or killed incidentally, but that is their 
choice.  The Authors agreed that this position, albeit problematic 
from a military standpoint, reflects customary international law.  
Issuing the warning may help satisfy Israel’s obligation to take 
precautions in attack as described below, but declining to heed the 
warning certainly does not result in the forfeiture of protection, 
absent other acts that constitute direct participation. 
 
5.5. Placement of Fighters and Military Objectives In or Near Civilian 
Facilities 
 
It is very common for Israel’s enemies to use civilian facilities for 
military purposes or to shield their operations.  The law is clear in 
such cases.  When used for military purposes, a civilian facility 
becomes a military objective “by use,” irrespective of the degree of 
use.  Thus, all so-called “dual-use” targets, that is, those used for 
both military and civilian purposes, qualify as military objectives.  
Examples include storage of weapons in a school, use of a mosque 
as an observation point, using civilian apartments as command and 
control locations, and physically shielding military equipment, 
personnel and activities from attack with civilian structures.183  If 
reliable intelligence exists that it will be employed for military 
                                                     
182 This assertion was discussed, for example, at a recent conference attended 
by one of the Authors and conducted under the Chatham House Rule. 
183 See, e.g., UNRWA strongly condemns placement of rockets in school, UNRWA 
(July 17, 2014), http://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/                    
unrwa-strongly-condemns-placement-rockets-school (condemning groups 
responsible for hiding weapons in a school); UNRWA condemns placement of rockets, 
for a second time, in one of its schools, UNRWA (July 22, 2014), 
http://www.unrwa.org/                      newsroom/press-releases/unrwa-condemns-
placement-rockets-second-time-one-its-schools (condemning the same a second 
time). 
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purposes in the future, a civilian entity becomes a military objective 
“by purpose” and may be attacked even before the conversion 
occurs.  
These rules are set forth in the aforementioned Article 52(2) of 
Additional Protocol I and are universally considered to be 
customary, including by Israel.184  Whether converted from civilian 
status by the use or purpose criterion, any expected damage to the 
entity concerned is not collateral damage in the proportionality 
sense and need not be considered with respect to precautions in 
attack.  It must be cautioned that damage to unmistakably distinct 
aspects of an entity that has been converted in part to military use is 
collateral damage. 
A persistent problem for the IDF is that Hamas and other 
organized armed groups sometimes use an apartment, floor, or 
particular section of a building for military purposes while the 
remainder is occupied by civilians or otherwise used for civilian 
purposes.  This raises the question of which parts of the building 
have been converted into a military objective and therefore do not 
factor into proportionality calculations or precautions in attack 
considerations.  In particular, if the IDF has the precision capability 
to strike a single apartment or floor within a building that is being 
used by the enemy, does any expected damage to the rest of the 
structure qualify as collateral damage? 
MAG officers to whom this question was posed were quick to 
distinguish law from policy.  As a matter of law, the IDF treats the 
building as a single object such that no damage to it is legally 
considered collateral damage.  For instance, if an airstrike is planned 
on an apartment on the third floor, but is expected to damage 
apartments used for civilian purposes on the floors beneath it, the 
expected damage need not be factored into any proportionality 
analysis, nor need measures be taken to avoid causing it pursuant to 
the precautions in attack requirement.  By this position, an attack on 
a building used for military purposes is lawful (subject to 
proportionality) even if the IDF does not know which apartment is 
being so used.  At the same time, the MAG officers indicated that 
whenever such situations presented themselves, the IDF sought to 
avoid any damage to the components of the target that are not being 
used for military purposes, including by employing, whenever 
                                                     
184 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.2; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 7 and 
commentary accompanying r. 8. 
68
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3
 
2015] TYRANNY OF CONTEXT 121 
 
feasible, precision-guided munitions.  Moreover, the IDF often has 
refrained from attacking certain multi-story buildings even when 
striking them would be permissible as a matter of law.  
Note that the position is limited to buildings that are a single 
structure.  For instance, the fact that two adjacent buildings might 
be connected by a walkway does not render them a whole for 
targeting purposes.  The IDF would also qualify any civilian 
property in the building as collateral damage.  Likewise, it takes any 
harm to civilians into consideration when doing the proportionality 
assessment. 
One of the Authors would come to a different conclusion.  He 
would suggest that if an attacker possesses the means of surgically 
striking an apartment (or other distinct section of a building) used 
for military purposes in a building that is otherwise civilian in 
character, and if the use of that means is militarily feasible in the 
circumstances, then damage to the civilian aspects of the building 
should be included in the proportionality analysis.  
This latter position will seldom affect the proportionality 
assessment because it only applies when the attacker is in possession 
of a precision weapon the effects of which are capable of being 
limited to a single apartment, floor, etc.  Thus, most collateral 
damage to the rest of the building would be unanticipated and 
therefore not “expected.”  But it would affect choice of weapon 
pursuant to the precautions in attack requirement.  For instance, 
assume a building will be struck at night when no civilians are 
present.  If the entire facility is a military objective as the IDF 
suggests, it would be permissible to use a weapon that would drop 
the entire structure; no damage to it would qualify as collateral.  Yet, 
by the alternative interpretation, if the IDF has a missile that can 
feasibly take out only the section of the building being used 
militarily, it must be employed to minimize harm to the aspects of 
the building that qualify as civilian in nature.  The relativity 
introduced into the proportionality and precautions in attack 
analysis based on the precision capabilities of an attacker parallels 
the well-accepted relativity of the precautions in attack requirement.  
Despite this difference of opinion, both Authors found the IDF 
position to be reasonable; they also took note of the fact that the IDF 
has a policy of limiting the damage that would generally result in 
compliance with the more restrictive interpretation. 
Such situations must be distinguished from those, frequent in 
the Israeli context, in which the enemy leverages the proximity of 
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civilian entities that have not been converted into a military 
objective by use or purpose.  The most common example the IDF 
faces today is placement of mobile and other rocket launchers near 
civilian residences in the hope that this will either deter attack or 
result in collateral damage that can be exploited for lawfare 
purposes.  In such cases, Israel’s enemies are often violating the 
LOAC requirement to segregate civilian and military objects when 
feasible.185  Nevertheless, Israel takes the position that any damage 
to adjacent civilian property is collateral damage that counts fully in 
the proportionality analysis and must be considered with respect to 
precautions.  The IDF correctly rejects the occasional argument that 
the enemy’s unlawful behavior relieves the IDF of its obligation to 
consider the damage as collateral damage.186 
MAG officers were quick to note that the IDF only attacks a 
structure when the enemy is using it for military purposes or when 
there is reliable intelligence that it will be so used.  A situation that 
the IDF often confronts involves a momentary use of a civilian 
structure for military purposes.  For instance, a mortar may be fired 
from the roof of the building, but those firing it flee the building 
rapidly so as to avoid the IDF response.  Since the building is not 
being used for military purposes at the time of the potential strike, 
it is no longer liable to attack absent later use or the possession of 
intelligence that indicates with a relatively high degree of certainty 
that it is going to be used again.  In such a case, it would qualify as 
a military objective by the purpose criterion.  
The exception to this rule is a structure that is repeatedly used 
for military purposes. According to the MAG officers interviewed, 
frequent repeated use of the same structure for military purposes 
will render it a military objective by use throughout the period 
involved.  The classic example would be a home that is regularly 
used by the enemy leadership to plan and coordinate operations.  Of 
particular note in this regard is criticism of the IDF for attacking the 
homes of Hamas leaders.187  The legal validity of the criticism 
                                                     
185 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 58; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 23–24. 
186 In this regard, note that AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(8) provides that “[a]ny 
violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their 
legal obligations with respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the 
obligation to take the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57.”  NWP 1–
14, supra note 115, at ¶ 6.2.5; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 140. 
187 See, e.g., HRW Q&A, supra note 58 (discussing issues related to attacking 
Hamas leaders in their homes). 
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depends on whether the home in question is used on a regular basis 
to coordinate Hamas military activities.  If not, it may only be struck 
when the leader is there (the attack would technically be on the 
leader).  If so, a strike during his absence would be lawful.  The 
Authors agreed that this approach represented a reasonable 
interpretation of the use criterion in the definition of military 
objective. 
 
 
5.6. Uncertainty 
 
Israel wields impressive intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, including human intelligence 
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), aerial platforms such as 
RPAs, cyber capabilities, and other means of verifying a target.  
Proximity to Israel eases the operational challenges normally 
associated with employing such assets.  Just as importantly, the IDF 
knows where it is most likely to fight in the near future – Gaza and 
Southern Lebanon—and has carefully prepared to do so.  It has 
operated in and occupied both areas and therefore has first hand 
understanding of their physical layout, patterns of life, and cultural 
practices.  The IDF and civilian intelligence agencies work 
assiduously to maintain this knowledge so as not to be 
disadvantaged militarily by virtue of the fact that their forces are 
most likely to fight on their enemies’ home turf.  At the same time, 
such understanding enhances their ability to identify targets and to 
distinguish them from civilians and civilian objects. 
Nevertheless, uncertainty often permeates the targeting process.  
This is especially the case with respect to urban areas such as Gaza 
where civilians and civilian objects are collocated with fighters and 
military objectives.  Moreover, Israel’s opponents, as described 
earlier, have adopted a strategy of operating near civilians and 
civilian objects and using civilians as human shields, both 
voluntarily and involuntarily.  This further enhances the degree of 
uncertainty attendant to IDF strikes.   
The IDF takes a very conservative approach towards 
uncertainty.  It accepts the Additional Protocol I, Article 50(1), 
requirement that “[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, 
that person shall be considered to be a civilian” as reflective of 
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customary LOAC.188  With respect to objects, the IDF affords the 
same status to the Article 52(3) requirement that “[i]n case of doubt 
whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, 
such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is 
being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it 
shall be presumed not to be so used.”189  Although it does not extend 
the presumption to other civilian objects as a matter of law, MAG 
officers explained that as a matter of operational and policy good 
sense in an environment in which their opponents actively employ 
lawfare, the presumption applies as a matter of policy to all 
objects.190 
The question remains, however, as to the degree of doubt that 
triggers these presumptions.  Israel applies a “reasonableness” 
standard.191  Specifically, would it be reasonable in the same or 
similar circumstances, after exhausting militarily feasible measures 
to verify the target, to proceed based on the information available 
and in the face of any uncertainty that remained?  From a practical 
perspective, it is perhaps better expressed in the negative as an 
assessment of whether the decision to attack is unreasonable; that is, 
would a reasonable operator in that situation refrain from launching 
the attack?  This standard has been adopted by many militaries and 
by tribunals reviewing targeting decisions made in the field.192  
The standard of reasonableness is sometimes characterized as a 
threshold.  By this approach, individuals may differ as to whether 
sufficient certainty exists to have crossed the threshold of 
reasonableness, but the threshold itself is a constant.  This approach 
seeks to quantify reasonableness.  For instance, at a recent 
                                                     
188 See also CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 6 
(restating the rule from Additional Protocol I regarding classification as a civilian 
in a case of doubt). 
189 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at commentary accompanying r. 10. 
190 The United States apparently does not view the latter presumption as 
customary in nature, although the usually cited basis for this conclusion, the Report 
on the Gulf War of 1990-91, is by now quite dated. See Gulf War Report, supra note 
128, at 627 (critiquing the presumption on the basis of practical warfare concerns). 
See also DINSTEIN, supra note 178, at 98 (stating the presumption that a civilian object 
is serving its normally dedicated services, in order to limit exposure to attack). 
191 See generally John Merriam, Affirmative Target Identification:  
Operationalizing the Principle of Distinction for U.S. Warfighters, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 
(forthcoming 2015) (discussing the issue of reasonableness in targeting). 
192 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 55 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Final Report to the Prosecutor, supra note 155, 
at ¶ 50.  
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conference, one non-Israeli participant suggested that an attack is 
reasonable when it is “more likely than not” that the target is a 
military objective.     
Although the IDF has taken no express position on this issue, the 
Authors would take a different view.  For them, the degree of doubt 
as to status that renders unreasonable a decision to attack is highly 
contextual.  In particular, when the anticipated military advantage 
is very high, as in the case of attacking an enemy leader or striking 
an important weapons storage area, the extent of doubt as to status 
that is legally acceptable increases.  By contrast, when expected 
collateral damage is high, it decreases.  Note that although military 
advantage and collateral damage are also factors in the 
proportionality analysis, here they affect the reasonableness of the 
determination that the target selected qualifies as a military 
objective or a targetable individual in the first place.  Other factors 
may also be relevant.  For example, if the target is a fleeting one 
unlikely to appear again, acceptable doubt increases, whereas if the 
target probably can be struck at a later date, the level of certainty 
required to render the strike reasonable will climb.  Given some of 
the similar circumstances the U.S. armed forces and the IDF faces in 
this regard, the Authors would be surprised if the IDF disagreed.  
 
5.7. Proportionality 
 
Israel fully accepts the articulation of the rule of proportionality 
set forth in Additional Protocol I, which prohibits attacks “expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”193  The prohibition is especially meaningful for the IDF 
given an operational environment that involves an enemy operating 
from an urban setting employing tactics such as human shielding, 
placement of military objectives and fighters in and near civilian 
objects, and adoption of lawfare-motivated operational techniques 
                                                     
193 AP I, supra note 74, at arts. 51, 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).  NWP 1-14, supra note 
115, at ¶ 8.3.1; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 14, 18, 19. See IDF Military Advocate 
General, Aerial Strikes against Terrorists, supra note 164 (confirming Israel’s 
acceptance of the rule). 
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intended to draw it into causing civilian casualties and damage to 
civilian objects.194   
Proportionality is also a major issue because of the sheer 
intensity of Israeli campaigns.  For instance, during Operation 
Protective Edge, which lasted 50 days, the IDF conducted strikes 
against nearly 5,000 targets mostly in populated areas of tiny 
Gaza.195  During these strikes around 2,100 Gazans were killed.196  
Israeli estimates note that around half of those killed were fighters 
who would not be factored into the collateral damage assessments 
performed for individual attacks.197  It must be cautioned in this 
regard that proportionality is assessed ex ante and not post factum; 
the legality of a strike with respect to the proportionality analysis is 
based on the expected collateral damage and anticipated military 
advantage, rather than that which eventuates.  But the point is that 
a high operational tempo in a small densely populated area lends 
itself to the unavoidable causation of collateral damage. 
As noted above with respect to identifying a target, Israeli ISR 
capabilities are impressive, as is its deep understanding of the target 
area and civilian activities therein.  This understanding gives it 
particular insight into what U.S. targeting experts call “pattern of 
life.”  In other words, the IDF has an excellent understanding of 
when, where, and how civilian activities normally occur in the target 
area, and it devotes additional resources to identify, as much as 
feasible, changes in these patterns during hostilities.  These 
capabilities undeniably enhance the accuracy of likely military 
advantage and collateral damage estimations during the targeting 
process.  Additionally, following general warnings to evacuate 
zones into which strikes will be conducted, the IDF monitors the 
area concerned to assess whether civilians have heeded the 
                                                     
194 Noam Neuman (currently head of the IDF’s International Law 
Department), Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force Protection and Cumulative 
Assessment in International Law and Morality, 7 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 79 (2004) 
(discussing proportionality from an Israeli perspective). 
195 See supra note 12 (reporting statistics on Operation Protective Edge). 
196 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY: GAZA EMERGENCY SITUATION REPORT 
(2014), available at http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_28_08_ 
2014.pdf (stating that 2,104 Palestinians were killed).  
197 Note that proportionality is calculated for individual strikes; it is not 
calculated for an entire conflict.  It would be technically incorrect to label a 
campaign as disproportionate because the expected harm to civilians and civilian 
objects is disproportionate. 
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warnings to more accurately make the proportionality 
determination; this is also true with respect to warnings of 
individual strikes. 
However, Israeli real time coverage of the target area not 
unlimited.  In particular, RPA sorties to assess potential collateral 
damage in the target area are constrained by the competing need to 
search for tunnel entrances and enemy activity within Israel.  As a 
result, air commanders have to carefully balance the requests for 
target area coverage designed to locate targets and monitor civilian 
activity against those intended to help protect the IDF and civilian 
population from attacks.  The ability of IDF Commanders to assess 
expected collateral damage is neither absolute nor flawless. 
Both Authors were struck by the weight accorded in the 
proportionality analysis to the military advantage of protecting the 
civilian population and individual soldiers.  Although they would 
not label it unwarranted in light of the unique operational context in 
which Israel finds itself, it was clear to them that avoidance of harm 
to the Israeli civilian population and the protection of individual 
soldiers loomed large in Israeli proportionality calculations.  Two 
examples illustrate this sensitivity. 
The Iron Dome system has proven highly effective against the 
rocket threat to the civilian population.  During Operation 
Protective Edge, the Iron Dome system intercepted 95% of the 
rockets directed against Israeli population centers.  This raises the 
question of whether the military advantage gained by targeting 
rocket launchers drops when on average a rocket fired on a 
trajectory that places a population center at risk has only a mere 5% 
chance of striking its target.  The effect on the proportionality 
calculation would be substantial if this were the case because the less 
the military advantage, the lower the lawful collateral damage.  The 
math would seem unassailable. 
Every Israeli government legal adviser with whom the Authors 
spoke rejected this approach.  They proffered numerous arguments 
against it, most of which are reducible to condemnation as overly 
formalistic.  First, they argue that rocket launchers, launching pads, 
and other offensive capabilities of the enemy possess inherent 
military value, which is significant enough to warrant a certain level 
of collateral damage.  Second, they say that a State's efforts to protect 
its population should not undermine its ability to diminish its 
adversary's offensive capabilities.  Third, they argue that the rocket 
attacks terrorize the civilian population and that the degree of terror 
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does not diminish in parallel with the decreased likelihood of a 
missile striking.  Restated, the population is not 95% less terrorized 
because of Iron Dome’s success rate.  Finally, these advisers stress 
that the IDF does not overstate the value of rocket launchers, saying 
they were unaware of any cases in which civilians lost their lives in 
attacks against such launchers.  The Authors agreed with the first 
three points, but they have no way to confirm the fourth.  In 
particular, they concurred with the advisers that preventing terror 
among the civilian population, as distinguished from fear that is 
only incidental to lawful attacks, is a legitimate military objective.  
This is so based on the fact that the LOAC prohibits attacks, “the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population.”198   
Nevertheless, the Authors were of the view that some decrease 
in the degree of terror is likely with improved defenses and that, 
accordingly, the military advantage of striking a rocket does 
diminish somewhat as the effectiveness of defenses increases.  This 
approach creates relativity in the proportionality analysis because 
those parties to a conflict with the best defenses sometimes will be 
estopped by the rule of proportionality from launching attacks that 
their less well-defended enemies would be entitled to conduct in the 
same circumstances.  However, the Authors pointed out that this is 
largely a theoretical problem. They also noted that in any event, 
relativity is already resident in the LOAC, like the relative 
obligations that are inherent in the precautions in attack notion of 
feasibility (see below) or the fact that the acceptable degree of 
uncertainty as to the status of a target is, as discussed, contextual. 
The Israeli perspective is evident in the so-called “Hannibal 
Directive,” which is classified.  According to open sources, the IDF 
promulgated the directive in the aftermath of the 1986 capture of 
two soldiers by Hezbollah.199  It is designed to prevent capture – 
both out of concern for the soldiers and to deprive the enemy of a 
strategic pawn.  The Hannibal Directive is mostly technical, setting 
forth various procedures for command and control.  The only 
                                                     
198 AP I, supra note 74, at art. 51(2); CIHL Study, supra note 75, at r. 2.  See also 
NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.9.1.2. (prohibiting “bombardment for the sole 
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population;” the limitation of this language to 
cases of “bombardment” makes sense in the context of a publication directed at 
naval commanders).   
199 See Margolit, supra note 33 (explaining the development and purposes of 
the Hannibal Directive).  
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substantive provision it includes concerns the risk that may be 
actively posed to the captured IDF soldier.  Essentially, the Hannibal 
Directive allows IDF commanders that are seeking either to prevent 
a soldier from being captured or to interdict an already-captured 
soldier before he vanishes to take aggressive measures including 
placing the soldier concerned at risk if necessary.  Israeli legal 
advisers willing to discuss the directive in broad terms stated that 
while it may permit operations that might otherwise not be allowed 
under the rules of engagement in force at the time, it does not 
dispense with the rule of proportionality or any other LOAC norm.  
The fact that a directive relaxes the rules of engagement in these 
cases demonstrates the military advantage the IDF attributes to 
keeping its soldiers out of enemy hands.  Interestingly, at the time 
this article was finalized the MAG was assessing a Hannibal 
Directive operation that was launched during Operation Protective 
Edge for compliance with LOAC and the rules of engagement; this 
engagement reportedly resulted in as many as 114 deaths in 
Rafah.200 
Expressly allowing the imposition of risk on an IDF soldier 
illustrates another facet of military advantage in the Israeli context, 
the denial of a strategic objective to the enemy, specifically, its desire 
to turn the Israeli population against the conflict.  As previously 
explained, because Israel’s enemies cannot prevail on the 
conventional battlefield, the IDF in not in itself a vulnerable center 
of gravity.  Instead, its enemies asymmetrically target the civilian 
population and individual soldiers as alternative critical 
vulnerabilities.  Therefore, attacking rocket launchers, striking 
tunnels, rescuing captured soldiers, and similar activities designed 
to protect the population and individual soldiers have to be 
considered from the perspective of denying the enemy a strategic 
objective rather than a tactical gain.  The Authors agreed that it is 
appropriate to consider defeat of the enemy’s strategic objectives as 
a factor in calculating the military advantage of an attack, so long as 
                                                     
200 See Gili Cohen, Israeli Army Mulling Criminal Probe Into Use of Hannibal 
Directive in Gaza, HAARETZ (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.haaretz.com/news/                  
diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.643111# (reporting on the Israeli Army’s possible 
criminal investigation into the Hannabal Directive); Maayan Lubell and Nidal al-
Mughrabi, Did Israel's 'Hannibal directive' lead to a war crime in Gaza?, REUTERS (Oct. 
13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-mideast-gaza-
warcrime-insight-idUSKCN0I20FN20141013 (describing the casualties and 
political effects of the Hannibal Directive).  
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the enemy is seeking to achieve said objectives militarily.  This 
would differentiate it from, for instance, undermining enemy 
civilian morale, which is not military advantage in the legal sense no 
matter how much it actually affects the course of a conflict.  
It is clear that when trying to rescue an individual soldier or 
defend in a position where one’s own forces are located, rescue and 
survival are factors that are taken into consideration in the military 
advantage calculation.  This is because the very purpose of the 
operation is to achieve those ends.  There has been an ongoing 
debate for a number of years over the issue of whether survival of 
one’s own forces and assets should be included in the military 
advantage estimate when defense of one’s forces is not a central goal 
of the operation.  The classic illustration is an aircraft that, because 
it is flying above the threat envelope of enemy surface-to-air 
missiles, is more likely to return to base than one flying within the 
threat envelope.  The question is whether it is appropriate to 
consider the pilot and aircraft’s safe return as an element of military 
advantage such that the proportionality calculation would 
countenance greater collateral damage.201 
 The IDF takes the position that it is appropriate, as does one of 
the Authors.202  The other Author is of the view that avoidance of 
risk is primarily a consideration when determining the military 
feasibility of precautions in attack as described below.203  For 
instance, flying at a lower altitude is a tactic that in some cases will 
enable a pilot to verify the target and identify potential collateral 
damage with greater accuracy.  Yet, the risk of flying within an 
enemy air defense system’s threat envelope would usually render 
such a tactic militarily infeasible and therefore a measure that need 
not be taken irrespective of any proportionality analysis. 
MAG officers correctly emphasized that the rule of 
proportionality only prohibits an attack when collateral damage is 
                                                     
201 See generally Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military 
Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack Under Additional Protocol I, 
203–206 (2009) (providing an excellent discussion of this problem and concluding 
that considering the preservation of one’s own forces is appropriate when 
determining military advantage in the proportionality context). 
202 See Neumann, supra note 194, at 91. 
203 Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 
(No. 859) INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 462 (2005).  See also DINSTEIN, supra note 178, at 
141–42 (describing the tension between the LOAC duty to avoid or minimize 
damage to civilians and a commander’s military duty to minimize damage to 
his/her own troops). 
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“excessive” relative to the anticipated military advantage, as should 
be apparent from the plain text of the relevant articles in Additional 
Protocol I.  The reference to “extensive” harm in the ICRC 
Commentary is therefore counter-textual.204  Similarly, there is no 
basis for an assertion that a strict balancing test applies such that if 
expected collateral damage “slightly outweighs” anticipated 
military advantage, the strike may not be launched.  Nor is 
excessiveness a mathematical calculation, as when the number of 
civilians harmed exceeds the number of combatants injured or 
killed.  Rather, excessive “means the disproportion is not in doubt . 
. . .”205  This interpretation is supported by addition of the term 
“clearly” in the relevant proportionality provision of the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.206  
 
5.8. Precautions in Attack  
 
Even when a strike is directed at a military objective and would 
comply with the rule of proportionality, the attacker must take 
precautions in attack to verify the target is a lawful military objective 
and minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.  This 
requirement is fulfilled by using all feasible means to verify the 
target and by selecting the weapons, tactics and targets that can best 
avoid causing collateral damage without sacrificing any military 
advantage.207   
Israel considers this prohibition, captured in Article 57 of 
Additional Protocol I, to be customary in nature.208  MAG officers 
interviewed by the Authors emphasized the extent to which their 
                                                     
204 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1980 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]. See also DINSTEIN, 
supra note 178, at 131 (distinguishing “excessive” from “extensive” damage). 
205 DINSTEIN, supra note 178, at 131. 
206 See id. (“ . . . the adverb ‘clearly’ is explicitly added in the Rome Statute.”).  
See also Rome Statute, supra note 81, art. 8(b)(iv) (stating that damage which is 
clearly excessive in relation to the military advantage expected qualifies as a serious 
violation falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC). 
207 See Jean-Francois Queguiner, Precaution under the Law Governing the Conduct 
of Hostilities, 88:864 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793 (2006) (discussing the general 
precautions required “to avoid, or at least minimize, collateral casualties and 
damage”). 
208 NWP 1–14, supra note 115, at ¶ 8.1; CIHL Study, supra note 75, at CH. 5. 
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operations complied with the requirement to take precautions when 
conducting attacks.  They cited the fact that over 2,000 “sensitive 
sites” were identified in Gaza that were either on a “no strike” list 
or that were “restricted” in the sense that an attack against them 
required special caution or higher-level approval than would 
otherwise be the case.209  Although the lists are classified, the MAG 
officers cited mosques as an example of a category necessitating 
higher-level approval.  
Additionally, the IDF carefully weaponeers each strike.  For 
instance, during Operation Protective Edge, the vast majority of the 
air-delivered weapons were precision-guided munitions (PGMs).  
In some cases, the IDF uses weapons that have been specifically 
designed with such characteristics as penetration capability, low 
blast, no blast (inert) or low fragmentation.  The IDF also considers 
tactics such as angle of attack, timing of the strike to occur when 
civilians are least likely to be in the area, or using weapons set to 
explode after burying into the target to minimize the collateral 
effects of the blast.  As mentioned, RPAs, when available, are used 
to verify the target’s status and to track targets to plan attacks when 
civilians are least likely to be harmed. 
According to IDF operational and legal officers, the IDF also 
requires multiple sources to verify a target, except in those 
circumstances where its forces are immediately taking fire (a 
“troops-in contact” or “TIC” situation).  These standards are set 
forth in classified standing IDF regulations that delineate the 
number and type of source required to verify particular categories 
of targets.  Although it is rarely done, the standards may be 
modified by an Operations Order (OpOrd) for a specific operation 
based on the operational environment and objectives, but only when 
the individual who approved the regulations or that individual’s 
superiors agree. 
During Operation Protective Edge, criticism was leveled at the 
IDF for its use of artillery in an urban area.210  As the Authors were 
                                                     
209 Sensitive sites are marked on operational maps used by the IDF. 
210 See Amnesty Int’l, Israel/Gaza: Attack on UN School in Gaza a Potential War 
Crime That Must Be Investigated (Jul. 30, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/    
articles/news/2014/07/israelgaza-attack-un-school-gaza-potential-war-crime-
must-be-investigated/ (noting its position that “it is inevitable that the repeated use 
of artillery in densely populated civilian neighbourhoods will lead to the unlawful 
killing and injury of civilians and destruction and damage to civilian buildings, 
regardless of the intended target.”). 
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unable to visit the area concerned, they can offer no comment on 
whether the use violated the requirement to resort to militarily 
feasible means of attack to minimize civilian casualties.  The Authors 
are of the view that there is no LOAC prohibition on using artillery 
in urban area; rather, its use is governed by the rule of 
proportionality and the requirement to take various precautions in 
attack.  As an example, it might be used to clear structures of enemy 
forces when ground forces are moving into a dense area from which 
the civilian population has evacuated, subject—of course—to the 
usual rules of LOAC, including proportionality.  IDF officers 
emphasized that the decision to employ artillery fire is not based 
merely on the unavailability of air assets but rather on the particular 
characteristics of the artillery in the attendant circumstances; it can 
often be the superior military choice of means because of its speed, 
flexibility, and persistence.   
IDF officers were quick to point out that the requirement to take 
precautions in attack is subject to the condition of feasibility.  
Feasible measures are those that are “practicable or practically 
possible, taking into account all circumstances prevailing at the 
time, including humanitarian and military considerations.”211  In 
some cases, feasibility may be an issue of asset availability, as in the 
case of RPAs.  MAG officers also accentuated the fact that the 
capability to engage in precautions in attack is always context 
specific.  For instance, in order to engage a fleeting target it may be 
necessary to task aircraft that are presently airborne.  Those aircrafts 
may not be armed with the optimal weapons to avoid collateral 
damage, but if it would not be militarily feasible to task another 
platform against the target the airborne aircraft may engage so long 
as the rule of proportionality is satisfied.  Human intelligence is 
                                                     
211 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at 54.  See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Reservation b, June 8 1977, ICRC Treaty, 
available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=        
openDocument&documentId=D9E6B6264D7723C3C12563CD002D6CE4 ( 
statements on “feasibility” made by the United Kingdom at the time of accession to 
AP I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps 
and Other Devices, art. 3(4), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (defining ‘feasible 
precautions’ as quoted in text); Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices art. 3(10), May 3, 1996, 2048 
U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter Amended Mines Protocol] (defining ‘feasible precautions’ 
further by listing examples of circumstances that should be included in the 
determination of feasibility); ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 204, at ¶ 2198 
(explaining the adoption of the words “feasible precautions”). 
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another contextual asset that affects feasibility.  In an area such as 
the West Bank where the IDF presently operates, it is more likely to 
have human intelligence sources that can verify a target than in 
Gaza, from which Israeli forces withdrew in 2005.  Of course, 
feasibility may be determined by factors as simple as foul weather 
that blinds certain on-board sensors of an RPA or other aircraft or 
interferes with the guidance of particular categories of weapons. 
What distinguishes IDF precautions in attack is their approach 
to warnings.212 Additional Protocol I, Article 57(2)(c), provides that 
“effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may 
affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not 
permit.”213  As should be apparent from the discussion above, the 
IDF takes exceptional measures to warn the civilian population of 
attacks that may affect them.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine more 
robust warnings during an armed conflict.  However, it is essential 
to distinguish Israel’s practice in this regard from its legal 
obligations. 
Israel takes the position that the requirement for warnings is 
customary in nature.  In its view, said warnings need only be 
effective in the sense of being communicated to civilians who may 
be affected by an attack and being delivered in a manner that 
permits those civilians to take measures to avoid harm.  
Effectiveness is not evaluated by how many civilians actually 
heeded the warning, but rather by whether or not the civilian 
population had sufficient opportunity to protect itself against 
impending attacks.  When multiple types of warning are possible, 
there is no requirement that any particular means be employed 
provided that the one selected meets the threshold of effectiveness.  
Nor is there any requirement that all feasible means of warning 
civilians be employed, that redundant means be used to ensure 
notification, that civilians be re-warned in the event they ignore a 
warning, or that the attacker set forth the means of finding safety 
(e.g., by designating no-fire areas to which the civilians should 
move).  
                                                     
212 See Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to Attack 
under International Law: Theory and Practice, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 361, 361 (2011) 
(exhibiting the views of a former and the present head of the IDF International Law 
Department on warnings).  
213 NWP 1-14, supra note 115, at 8.9.2. (requiring warnings in advance of 
bombardment “when the military situation permits.”); CIHL Study, supra note 75, 
at r. 20. 
82
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3
 
2015] TYRANNY OF CONTEXT 135 
 
The MAGs interviewed stressed, correctly so, that a warning 
need not be issued when circumstances do not permit, as when a 
warning may heighten the risk to the attacker or forfeit the element 
of surprise.214  In certain situations, the IDF has chosen not to warn 
on this basis.  This is most often the case when targeting a particular 
individual because a warning would allow him to escape.  As a 
practical matter then, this means that warnings of a strike on a 
building are usually only issued when the building itself is a target 
based on its use or purpose.  MAG officers stressed that although a 
warning might not be issued in advance of a strike targeting an 
individual in a building, the attack would be fully subject to the rule 
of proportionality and the other precautions in attack requirements.  
Additionally, if feasible, civilians who might be affected in adjacent 
buildings will be warned. 
Circumstances may allow for a warning, but not permit much 
time for the civilian population to leave.  This situation will typically 
arise when the enemy is using the warnings to either know when 
and where to use human shields or take measures to prevent the 
civilians there from leaving.  Such practices may leave only a narrow 
window of opportunity to strike before the number of individuals 
likely to be harmed in the attack rises.  Therefore, a strike soon after 
a warning may in certain circumstances be the best means for 
minimizing civilian injury even when it does not afford civilians a 
great deal of time to leave or take shelter. 
The Israeli practice of roof knocking described earlier has been 
criticized by human rights groups and during investigations of 
Israeli practices, most notably in the controversial Goldstone 
Report.215  Roof knocking has been characterized as increasing the 
risk to the civilians being warned and as an attack on a civilian 
object.  These criticisms are counter-factual and counter-normative.  
First, the technique is only used when warnings have been issued 
and ignored or were infeasible to begin with.  In such circumstances, 
the target is already subject to attack at the time the roof knocking 
occur; thus, if the civilians leave based on the technique, risk to them 
will have been dramatically reduced.  As to the second point, the 
                                                     
214 CIHL Study, supra note 75, at Commentary to r. 20; ICRC COMMENTARY, 
supra note 204, at ¶ 2223. 
215 See Goldstone Report, supra note 69, at ¶¶ 532–535. See also Laurie Blank, 
The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: a Critical Commentary, 12 Y.B INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 347 (2009) (criticizing how the Goldstone Report applied the 
LOAC). 
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technique is only used when the building has been converted into a 
military objective through use (such as weapons storage).  The intent 
is to motivate civilians remaining in the lawful target to depart. 
Overall, the susceptibility of Israel to offensive lawfare by its 
enemies drives the IDF into taking precautions in attack that far 
exceed those required by the LOAC.  Indeed, the Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff recently sent a “lessons learned” team to 
Israel to examine measures the IDF takes to limit collateral damage 
during operations in urban areas.216  In this regard, the Authors 
would hasten to add that many of those taken by Israel are based on 
policy, not the strictures of the LOAC.  Therefore, before adopting 
such measures, the United States and other States would be well 
advised to carefully consider whether the same policy concerns 
animate operations in which they are involved. 
 
6.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
The central finding of this project is that the unique Israeli 
operational context described in Part I exerts an almost tyrannical 
influence over the IDF’s legal organization and Israel’s 
understanding and application of the LOAC.  The driving forces in 
this context are 1) the risk of direct attack faced by the Israeli civilian 
population due to geography and enemy strategy and 2) the 
extremely high value Israel places on the safety of its soldiers.  
Israel’s enemies clearly understand the extent to which these two 
factors loom large for Israel and exploit them to offset the qualitative 
and technical advantages that Israel enjoys in conventional warfare.  
They do this by directly targeting the Israeli population, seeking to 
capture individual Israeli soldiers and engaging in lawfare tactics.   
IDF operations are clearly well-regulated and subject to the rule 
of law.  The IDF has extremely robust systems of examination and 
investigation of operational incidents, and there is significant 
civilian oversight, both by the Attorney General and the Supreme 
Court.  With respect to the MAG Corps, the Authors found its 
officers to be exceptionally competent, highly professional, and 
well-trained.  The extent to which MAG officers are independent of 
                                                     
216 David Alexander, Israel Tried to Limit Civilian Casualties in Gaza: U.S. Military 
Chief, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/ 06/us-
israel-usa-gaza-idUSKBN0IQ2LH20141106. 
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commanders, especially when providing legal advice during 
ongoing operations, is striking.  For instance, the fact that the MAG 
officers report up the legal, rather than operational, chain of 
command deviates from the practice of many other countries that 
engage regularly in combat, including the United States.  In the view 
of the Authors, the Israeli system generates both positive and 
negative consequences.  It fosters compliance with the law through 
MAG Corps possession of a “red card” vis-à-vis individual strikes 
and the concentration of investigative and prosecutorial authority in 
the Military Advocate General.  However, the system sacrifices the 
intangible, but very real, relationship between Commanders and 
their judge advocates that results from being a member of the 
Commander’s team.  This relationship is, in the personal experience 
of the Authors, a key factor in securing the Commander’s 
recognition that the law can serve as an enabler of broader 
operational and strategic objectives, rather than an obstacle to 
mission accomplishment.    
Despite the difference in approach, the Israeli system is arguably 
better suited to the unique operational and strategic context in 
which Israel operates.  In particular, because the IDF fights enemies 
who intentionally employ lawfare as a tactic and strategy, it has to 
be extremely cautious when conducting a strike that might be 
exploited.  In such an environment, it is sensible to grant legal 
advisors greater authority than they might otherwise enjoy in a 
more traditional combat environment. 
The operational context in which Israel finds itself also drives 
the IDF's approach to targeting.  Given the geography of Israel and 
the multiple potential enemies it faces, centralizing air targeting and 
decentralizing ground attacks makes sense.  Moreover, the 
operational tempo of the operations merits close legal supervision, 
which the Operational Law Apparatus is designed to provide.  It is 
clear that the deliberate targeting cycle process employed by the 
Israeli Air Force is constructed so as to identify legal issues as they 
crop up and to facilitate compliance with LOAC as operations are 
being planned, approved and executed.  Doing so is, as discussed, 
essential to countering the specific tactics employed by Israel's 
opponents. 
 The need for caution in the face of such enemy tactics caused 
the Authors surprise with respect to ground targeting.  In particular, 
the Authors found it curious that the IDF does not place legal 
advisers into the individual Attack Cells.  Dynamic targeting, such 
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as that conducted in the cells, can prove highly problematic because 
the situation is often murky and unfolds rapidly.  During 
preplanned targeting, by contrast, there is more time to consider a 
legally problematic situation and seek advice.  It would seem that a 
MAG officer in the targeting cells would be no less valuable than 
those serving in the OLA for deliberate air targeting.  Although the 
Authors found the confidence displayed by IDF ground 
commanders in their own ability to apply the LOAC and the rules 
of engagement impressive, they were concerned that this 
confidence, if not properly channeled and monitored by legal 
advisers, could become counterproductive. 
In terms of the law, there were no findings that would mark 
Israel as an outlier with respect to any particular norm.  On the 
contrary, in most cases Israel’s legal position on its customary law 
obligations is in accord with the targeting laws set forth in 
Additional Protocol I, as the Parties thereto typically interpret them.  
On a number of issues, Israel takes a different approach than 
Additional Protocol I parties, but none of its stances is unique; in 
most cases other non-Parties to the Additional Protocol, such as the 
United States, share them.  It is especially noteworthy that the IDF 
now applies the notion of organized armed groups as a basis for 
targeting, apparently on the ground that the Supreme Court's 
approach in the Targeting Killing case is ill suited to the 
contemporary operational context.  Israel’s rejection of the notion of 
continuous combat function likewise demonstrates the IDF’s 
sensitivity to the truism that the LOAC must be understood in, and 
responsive to, the context in which it is applied. 
Although the Israeli positions on the LOAC principles and rules 
governing targeting are rather orthodox, the unique operational 
environment in which Israel finds itself clearly affects interpretation 
and application.  As an example, given the propensity of Israel’s 
enemies to use human shields, it is unsurprising that Israel has taken 
the position that individuals voluntarily acting in this manner are to 
be treated as direct participants in hostilities.  In light of its enemies’ 
frequent failure to distinguish itself from the civilian population, it 
is equally unsurprising that Israel has embraced the principle of 
reasonableness with respect to target identification.  Perhaps most 
noteworthy is the high value Israel places on the safety of its soldiers 
and its civilian population.  Although impossible to quantify, both 
Authors were convinced these concerns significantly influenced the 
value judgments made by Israeli commanders as they plan and 
86
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss1/3
 
2015] TYRANNY OF CONTEXT 139 
 
execute military operations, value judgments that often come into 
play in the application of such LOAC concepts as proportionality.   
In the Authors’ opinion, use of lawfare by Israel’s enemies 
likewise shapes, whether consciously or not, Israel’s interpretation 
and application of the LOAC.  In particular, Israel has adopted an 
inclusive approach to the entitlement to protected status, 
particularly civilian status.  Examples include Israel’s positions on 
doubt, its treatment of involuntary shields as civilians who are not 
directly participating and its view that individuals who ignore 
warnings retain their civilian status.  Although these positions 
might seem counterintuitive for a State that faces foes who exploit 
protected status for military and other gain, such positions are well 
suited to counter the enemy’s reliance on lawfare.  In this regard, 
Israel’s LOAC interpretations actually enhance its operational and 
strategic level position despite any tactical loss.  Along the same 
lines, in many cases, the IDF imposes policy restrictions that go 
above and beyond the requirements of LOAC. 
Ultimately, this first look inside Israeli targeting revealed a 
system and an approach to the law that has been carefully crafted to 
take account of the distinctive operational context in which Israel 
finds itself, a context which drives its opponents into the adoption 
of strategies and tactics that in turn influence the Israeli approach.  
In other words, the operational and legal environments are highly 
synergistic and evolve continuously.  It remains to be seen which 
elements of the system described above will survive the next war. 
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